仲裁案件被告提出和解

专题五　仲裁当事人

外贸代理

◎某油压股份有限公司诉上海某某贸易有限公司买卖合同纠纷案(2008年，中国上海市第一中级人民法院)

代理人

◎Louis Dreyfus v.Cereal Mangimi(2009年，意大利最高法院)

签约时无授权

◎Austrian Limited Liability Company v.Austrian Joint Stock Company(2009年，奥地利最高法院)

追加当事人

◎某某机械(焦作)有限公司申请撤销仲裁裁决案(2010年，中国河南省焦作市中级人民法院)

未签字方

◎Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Comp.v.The Ministry of Religious Affairs，Government of Pakistan(2009年，2010年，英国上诉法院，最高法院)

公共主体

◎No.2008/20609(2009年，土耳其最高法院)

国家机构

◎Frontera Resources Azerbaijan Corp.v.State Oil Co.of the Azerbaijan Republic(2009年，美国第二巡回上诉法院)

消费者合同

◎L AS v.Jürgen H and Others(2009年，奥地利最高法院)

转让

◎Trioplast SMS v.Sainte Germaine(2009年，法国最高法院)

公司章程

◎No.4A_446/2009(2009年，瑞士联邦最高法院)

更名

◎China National Building Material Investment Co.，Ltd.v.BNK International LLC(2009年，美国得克萨斯州西区地区法院)

被执行人破产

◎Metallurgtrans LLC v.PromoTrans Company LLC(2009年，俄罗斯联邦仲裁法院)

◎Jozef Syska＆Elektrim v.Vivendi Universal S.A.＆Others(2009年，英国上诉法院)

揭开公司面纱

◎Abener Energia＆Sunopta v.Sunopta＆Abener Energia(2009年，加拿大安大略高等法院)

◎外贸代理

某油压股份有限公司诉上海某某贸易有限公司买卖合同纠纷案

(2008年，中国上海市第一中级人民法院)

法院受理原告某油压股份有限公司诉被告上海某某贸易有限公司买卖合同纠纷一案后，被告上海某某贸易有限公司在提交答辩状期间对管辖权提出异议，认为原告提起本案诉讼所依据的三份进口买卖合同中的第20条均明确约定:“因执行本合同或与本合同有关的争议，应由双方通过友好协商予以解决，如果协商不能解决时，应提交中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会上海分会，根据中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会仲裁规则进行仲裁。”本案中，与原告签订该三份合同的相对人上海某某国际贸易有限公司系被告的委托代理人，原告对此是明知的，故该三份合同直接约束原、被告双方。因此，本案应由中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会上海分会仲裁。

原告认为:(1)根据仲裁法的规定，约定仲裁必须有双方当事人明确的意思表示。本案中，原告只与案外人上海某某国际贸易有限公司约定了仲裁条款，与被告间并不存在仲裁管辖的约定。(2)原告提起本案诉讼系依据《中华人民共和国合同法》第402条之规定，该条款规定的只是实体上的请求权，并不包括程序上的管辖约定。

法院认为，《中华人民共和国合同法》第402条规定:“受托人以自己的名义，在委托人的授权范围内与第三人订立的合同，第三人在订立合同时知道受托人与委托人之间的代理关系的，该合同直接约束委托人和第三人……”现原告明确表示其系依据上述法律规定，直接向被告主张债权，据此可以认定，上海某某国际贸易有限公司作为被告的受托人与原告签订的三份进口贸易合同直接约束原、被告双方，即原告在以《中华人民共和国合同法》第402条为法律依据直接向被告行使实体上的债权请求权的同时，亦应受被告受托人与其签订的进口买卖合同中约定的管辖条款的约束，故被告可以该三份合同中仲裁条款的约定直接向原告提出抗辩。因该三份合同中均明确约定了仲裁管辖条款，故被告提出的管辖异议成立，本案不属人民法院受理范围，原告的起诉应予驳回。

◎代理人

Louis Dreyfus v.Cereal Mangimi

(2009年，意大利最高法院)

两家公司均为意大利公司，其所签合同中包括仲裁条款。争议发生后，一方起诉，另一方主张存在仲裁条款。一审法院和上诉法院均驳回仲裁的主张，认为仲裁条款是无效的，理由是仲裁条款所在的书面合同是由一名代理人所签订的，而该代理人仅得到口头授权，这与意大利民事诉讼法典第1392条的规定相悖。异议意见认为，仲裁协议的书面形式仅是用于证明所提及的协议，不影响其效力。

最高法院驳回异议，认为，根据《纽约公约》第2条，书面形式是仲裁条款有效所必需的，本案中合同援引其他格式的事实，并不意味着《纽约公约》的书面要件得到满足。无论代理人的授权是口头或是书面，均是如此。签订合同的行为能力表明其具有签订仲裁协议的能力，故代理人授权的效力由合同自身而非仲裁条款来决定。

◎签约时无授权

Austrian Limited Liability Company v. Austrian Joint Stock Company

(2009年，奥地利最高法院)

原告和被告之间签订有合同。因被告的代理人没有充分授权，仲裁条款是无效的。但尽管如此，被告仍依合同规定提起仲裁。原告未对此表示异议，双方进行了仲裁程序。仲裁庭作出对原告不利的裁决后，原告向地区法院申请撤销仲裁裁决，认为签订合同的被告代理人没有充分的授权，因此仲裁条款是无效的，但被法院驳回。原告于是向最高法院提起上诉。

最高法院认为，虽然仲裁条款在签订时可能是无效的，但其后已经通过当事人默示的同意以及进行仲裁程序予以了补救。奥地利民事诉讼法典规定仲裁条款应由当事人或其授权代理人书面达成。本案中被告的代理人虽无必要授权，但在其后的程序中，被告已经指示其律师依该仲裁条款提起仲裁，相当于追认了初始无效的仲裁条款。因此，本案仲裁条款是有效的，各方的程序权利没有受到侵犯。

◎追加当事人

某某机械(焦作)有限公司申请撤销仲裁裁决案

(2010年，中国河南省焦作市中级人民法院)

申请人某某机械公司诉称，仲裁庭没有追加焦作高新区某某北方生产基地项目工程指挥部(以下简称高新区指挥部)作为被申请人参加仲裁，违反了法定审理程序。2007年9月11日，某某机械公司与高新区指挥部共同作为发包人与焦作某某公司签订了建设工程施工合同。工程竣工验收由高新区指挥部与某某机械公司共同作为发包人进行，工程竣工结算审核也由高新区指挥部与某某机械公司共同委托进行，所有的工程款均由高新区指挥部直接支付给焦作某某公司。但在焦作某某公司单独向某某机械公司主张工程欠款时，仲裁庭没有依法追加高新区指挥部参加仲裁活动，裁决由某某机械公司单方负责向焦作某某公司支付工程款。仲裁庭遗漏当事人明显违反法定程序。

法院认为，合同发包方应为某某机械公司和高新区指挥部，但仲裁仅将某某机械公司作为当事人，而高新区指挥部并未作为本案当事人，漏列主体，属仲裁违反法定程序。故申请人某某机械公司以程序违法申请撤销裁决的理由成立，其请求予以支持。

◎未签字方

Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Comp.v. The Ministry of Religious Affairs，Government of Pakistan

(2009年，2010年，英国上诉法院，最高法院)

Dallah和巴基斯坦政府签订一份谅解备忘录后，巴基斯坦政府设立了一个信托基金。该信托基金与Dallah签订了一份合同，其中包含有国际商会仲裁条款。巴基斯坦政府未以任何身份在该合同上签字。后发生争议，Dallah以巴基斯坦宗教事务所为被申请人提起仲裁，巴基斯坦政府否认其是合同的一方，并对仲裁庭的管辖权提出异议，但未能得到仲裁庭的支持。仲裁庭最终裁决巴基斯坦政府应当承担损害赔偿责任。在Dallah得到执行许可之后，巴基斯坦政府申请撤销该执行许可，理由是根据1996年仲裁法第103(2)(b)条，仲裁协议无效。一审的时候，法官认为，当事人未约定仲裁条款应适用的法律，故应适用仲裁裁决作出地的法律，即法国法律。法官对法国法律的证据进行了聆讯，并认定根据该证据，巴基斯坦政府并非仲裁协议的当事人，因此不存在有效仲裁协议。

Dallah上诉称在确定巴基斯坦政府是否已经证实仲裁协议无效一点上，法官所用的方法是错误的。但上诉被驳回。上诉法院认为，法官将相关问题视为法定解释问题及其对第103(2)(b)条的结论是正确的。该条要求提出异议的当事人有权要求法院审理相关的证据，包括外国法。在本案中，根据法国法的原则，巴基斯坦政府受仲裁协议约束这一点，并非所有当事人的主观意愿。1996年英国仲裁法和《纽约公约》均保留了外国仲裁裁决的当事人以质疑基本效力及一致性的理由对裁决提出异议。巴基斯坦政府并无义务在法国提出异议，不能仅以未在监督法院提出异议为由承认和执行仲裁裁决。

后Dallah又向最高法院提起上诉，但其上诉亦被驳回。

1996年英国仲裁法103条(承认或执行的拒绝)

(1)除下述情况外，不得拒绝承认或执行《纽约公约》裁决。

(2)被寻求承认或执行裁决的一方当事人，如能证明以下情况，则裁决可被拒绝:

(a)仲裁协议的一方当事人(根据适用于他的法律)无行为能力;

(b)根据当事人选择适用于仲裁协议的法律，或未指明适用的法律时根据裁决作出地国法律规定，仲裁协议是无效的;

(c)其未得到委任仲裁员或进行仲裁程序的适当通知，或因他故不能陈述案件;

(d)裁决解决的并非当事人约定或交付仲裁之条款所包含的争议，或包含超出提交仲裁范围的事项的决定(第4款除外);

(e)仲裁庭组成或仲裁程序未依当事人的约定，或无约定而未依仲裁发生地国家的法律;

(f)仲裁裁决尚未对当事人产生约束力，或已被裁决作出地国或裁决所依据法律之国家有权机构撤销或中止。

(3)如裁决涉及事项是不可通过仲裁解决的，或者承认或执行裁决违反公共秩序的，则也可以拒绝承认或执行裁决。

(4)包含对未提交仲裁事项作出决定的裁决可得到承认或执行，如果该决定可与已提交仲裁事项的决定划分开来。

(5)如已向上述第(2)款第(f)项规定的有权机构提出撤销或中止裁决的申请，则寻求向其援引裁决的法院如认为合适，可对裁决的承认与执行延期作出决定。

经请求承认或执行裁决的当事人申请，法院可以命令对方当事人提供妥适的担保。

→判决摘录

(a)The law of the country where the award was made.

14.It is common ground that the award was made in France and French law is relevant.But it is also common ground that this does not mean the French law that would be applied in relation to a purely domestic arbitration.In relation to an international arbitration，the experts on French law called before Aikens J by Dallah and the Government agreed in their Joint Memorandum(para 2.8)that:

“Under French law，the existence，validity and effectiveness of an arbitration agreement in an international arbitration...need not be assessed on the basis of a national law，be it the law applicable to the main contract or any other law，and can bedetermined according to rules of transnational law”.

The approach taken in French law appears in decisions of the Court of Appeal of Paris，in particular Menicucci v Mahieux［1976］Rev Crit 507(13 December 1975) and Coumet et Ducler v Polar-Rakennusos a Keythio［1990］Rev Arb 675(8 March 1990)，and later in the decision of the Cour de Cassation(1re Ch.Civ)(20 December 1993)in Municipalité de Khoms El Mergeb v Dalico［1994］1 Rev Arb 116，where the court said that:

“...en vertu d'une règle matérielle du droit international de l'arbitrage，la clause compromissoire est indépendante juridiquement du contrat principal qui la contient directement ou par référence et que son existence et son efficacité s'apprécient，sous réserve des règles impératives du droit fran9ais et de l'ordre public international，d'après la commune volonté des parties，sans qu'il soit nécessaire de se référer à une loiétatique...”

15.This language suggests that arbitration agreements derive their existence，validity and effect from supra-national law，without it being necessary to refer to any national law.If so，that would not avoid the need to have regard to French law as“the law of the country where the award was made”under Article V(1)(a)of the Convention and s.103(2)(b)of the 1996 Act.The Cour de Cassation is，however，a national court，giving a French legal view of international arbitration;and Dallah and the Government agree that the true analysis is that French law recognises transnational principles as potentially applicable to determine the existence，validity and effectiveness of an international arbitration agreement，such principles being part of French law.As Miss Heilbron QC representing Dallah put it，“transnational law is part of French law”．Mr Landau QC representing the Government now accepts this analysis(although in his written case，para 157，he appeared to take issue with it and Aikens J，para 93，in fact disregarded transnational law on the basis that it was not part of French law，but relevant only under French conflict of laws principles and so not within Article V(1)(a)and s.103(2)(b))．

16.Since the point is common ground，I merely record that Mr Landau referred the Court to Pierre Mayer's note on Ducler in KluwerArbitration，explaining the rationale of the Paris Court of Appeal decisions as being to confine the restrictive provisions of article 2061 of the French Civil Code to internal contracts.He also referred to Fouchard，Gaillard，Goldman's International Commercial Arbitration(1999)(Kluwer)，para 440，describing as“somewhat unfortunate”the terminology used in(French) decisions referring to an arbitration agreement as autonomous from“any national law”and as having its“own effectiveness”，and observing that“a contract can only be valid by reference to a law that recognises such validity”.

Finally，in response to a 1977 commentary，suggesting that the validity of an arbitration clause in an international contract“resulted solely from the will of the parties，independently of any reference to the law of the main contract，and to any national law”and describing this as“the ultimate pinnacle of autonomy”，Poudret and Besson's Comparative Law of International Arbitration 2nd ed(2007)，para 180 also said that:

“...it is only the first two aspects，i.e.indifference to the fate of the main contract and the possibility of being submitted to a separate law，that flow logically from the principle of separability.The latter by no means implies that the arbitration agreement is independent of any national law.The real justification of this regime lies elsewhere:as Philippe Fouchard emphasises in his note on the Menicucci judgment，the aim is to remove the obstacles which certain laws，including French law，bring to the development of international arbitration.Although the judgment does not say so，this new conception of separability implies abandoning the conflict of laws approach in favour of material rules，which are in reality part of French law and not of any international or transnational system.We shall see this point with the Dalico judgment.”

In the light of the common ground between the parties，it is also unnecessary to engage with the competing representations of international arbitration lucidly discussed in Gaillard's Legal Theory of International Arbitration(2010)pp.13－66.Whatever the juridical underpinning or autonomy of their role from the viewpoint of international arbitrators，the present case involves an application to enforce in the forum of a national court，subject to principles defined by s.103 of the 1996 Act and Article V of the New York Convention，upon the effect of which there is substantial，though not complete，agreement between the parties now before the Supreme Court.

◎公共主体

No.2008/20609

(2009年，土耳其最高法院)

申请人是土耳其一市政当局，被申请人是土耳其一电力公司。一次洪灾过后，某座桥上的电力设备需要被移走，根据相关法律，只有被申请人有权移动。经申请人再三要求，被申请人拒不移动设备，于是申请人代其移动，并在其后向该被申请人追索所花费用。根据土耳其有关法律，市政当局和公共主体之间的争议应强制仲裁，并由一审法院作为仲裁员。

裁决作出之后，一方提出异议，认为被申请人并不属于法律规定应强制仲裁的公共主体范围之内。该异议被一审法院驳回后，案件最终提交至最高法院，由最高法院作出裁定。最高法院认为，被申请人不适用相关的法律，不能作为公共主体，故将案件发回重审，一审法院应作为一般法院审理，而不应作为强制仲裁中的仲裁员。

◎国家机构

Frontera Resources Azerbaijan Corp.v. State Oil Co.of the Azerbaijan Republic

(2009年，美国第二巡回上诉法院)

申请人是位于开曼群岛的一家公司，被申请人是阿塞拜疆的一家公司，双方签订了一份在阿塞拜疆开发和管理油藏的合同。后发生争议进行仲裁，仲裁庭作出有利申请人的裁决。申请人于美国根据《纽约公约》申请执行裁决。被申请人以缺乏属人管辖权为由申请驳回。美国纽约南区地区法院支持被申请人的申请。申请人提起上诉。

上诉法院首先认为，对于当事人具有管辖权是法院行使对当事人控制的基本要求，《纽约公约》第5条规定了抗辩执行的实质性理由，但并没有改变这项基本要求。法院认为，外国并非有权享受正当程序条款项下权利的“人”，但是，本案中的被申请人是否有权享受正当权利保护的问题并没有解决，因为诸如被申请人这样的国家机构，根据其是否可以视为国家“代理”或较少受到控制的机构，可能会受到保护。故上诉法院将本案发回地区法院重新审查被申请人是否是阿塞拜疆的“代理”。

→判决摘录

The Due Process Clause famously states that“no person shall be...deprived of life，liberty or property without due process of law.”U.S.Const.amend.V(emphasis added)．In Texas Trading，we held that a foreign state was a“person”within the meaning of the Due Process Clause，and that a court asserting personal jurisdiction over a foreign state must—in addition to complying with the FSIA—therefore engage in“a due process scrutiny of the court's power to exercise its authority”over the state.647 F.2d at 308，313(“［T］he［FSIA］cannot create personal jurisdiction where the Constitution forbids it”)．Texas Trading reached this conclusion without much analysis，while also noting that cases on point were“rare.”Id.at 313.The FSIA had been enacted only five years earlier，and pre-FSIA suits against foreign states were generally supported by quasi in rem jurisdiction.Id.Subsequently，we applied Texas Trading not only to foreign states but also to their agencies and instrumentalities. See，e.g.，Seetransport Wiking Trader Schiffarhtsgesellschaft MBH＆Co.v. Navimpex Centrala Navala，989 F.2d 572，579－80(2d Cir.1993)(“applying ship sales through its governmental office in Manhattan”)．

Since Texas Trading，however，the case law has marched in a different direction. In Republic of Argentina v.Weltover，Inc.，the Supreme Court“assum［ed］，without deciding，that a foreign state is a‘person’for purposes of the Due Process Clause，”504 U.S.607，619(1992)，but then cited South Carolina v.Katzenbach，383 U.S. 301，323－24(1966)，which held that“States of the Union are not‘persons’for purposes of the Due Process Clause，”504 U.S.at 619.Weltover did not require deciding the issue because Argentina's contacts satisfied the due process requirements，see id.at 619＆n.2，but the Court's implication was plain:If the“States of the Union”have no rights under the Due Process Clause，why should foreign states?

After Weltover，we noted that“we are uncertain whether［Texas Trading］remains good law.”Hanil Bank v.PT Bank Negara Indon.，148 F.3d 127，134(2d Cir.1998)．But we went no further in Hanil Bank because the due process requirements were satisfied in that case.See id.The instant case is different，however，as only the Due Process Clause prevented the district court from asserting personal jurisdiction over SOCAR.

In Price v.Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya，294 F.3d 82(D.C.Cir. 2002)，the D.C.Circuit reasoned that because“the word‘person’in the context of the interpretation，be expanded to encompass the States of the Union，”Katzenbach，383 U.S.at 323，“absent some compelling reason to treat foreign sovereigns more favorably than‘States of the Union，’it would make no sense to view foreign states as‘persons’under the Due Process Clause，”294 F.3d at 96.The Price court found no such reason，see id.at 95－100，and we find that case's analysis persuasive.As the Price court noted，the States of the Union“both derive important benefits［from the Constitution］and must abide by significant limitations as a consequence of their participation［in the Union］，”id.at 96，2 yet a“‘foreign State lies outside the structure of the Union，’”id.(quoting Principality of Monaco v.Mississippi，292 U.S.313，330(1934))．

If the States，as sovereigns that are part of the Union，cannot“avail themselves of the fundamental safeguards of the Due Process Clause，”Price，294 F.3d at 97，“rights derived from the Constitution，”and when courts have instead“relied on principles of comity and international law to protect foreign governments in the American legal system.”Id.For the reasons discussed by the Price court in its thorough opinion，we“are unwilling to interpret the Due Process Clause as conferring rights on foreign nations that States of the Union do not possess.”Id.at 99.Thus，we hold that the district court erred，albeit understandably in light of Texas Trading，by holding that foreign states and their instrumentalities are entitled to the jurisdictional protections of the Due Process Clause.

◎消费者合同

L AS v.Jürgen H and Others

(2009年，奥地利最高法院)

在本案当中，奥地利最高法院认为，虽然侵犯消费者保护法的规定违反实体公共政策，但是消费者合同中的仲裁条款原则上并不构成此类侵犯，只要这类合同是经过具体的协商。本案中，被告并没有声称所涉条款未经充分协商，故不能证明违反公共政策。

◎转让

Trioplast SMS v.Sainte Germaine

(2009年，法国最高法院)

Trioplast A B与Sainte Germaine签订有一份合同，其中包括斯德哥尔摩仲裁条款。后在合同履行过程中，Trioplast SMS替代了Trioplast A B。双方发生争议，Trioplast SMS终止合同，Sainte Germaine向法国法院提起诉讼，Trioplast SMS则援引仲裁条款认为法院没有管辖权。一审法院和上诉法院认为，Trioplast SMS无权援引仲裁条款，因为终止通知没有援引任何合同关系，且没有证据证明Sainte Germaine收到过合同转让的通知或接受该合同转让。法国最高法院推翻下级法院的判决，认为所涉仲裁协议既非无效，也不是不可执行的，故法院不能行使管辖权。

◎公司章程

No.4A_446/2009

(2009年，瑞士联邦最高法院)

本案所涉公司的章程中包含有仲裁条款。法院认定，公司章程中的仲裁条款仅适用于公司与其董事会成员之间的争议，但是对于公司的债权人没有约束力。债权人对于公司章程的内容没有任何影响力。因此，允许一个公司以及其董事会成员，在公司破产的过程中，通过公司章程的内容限制其债权人发起责任诉讼的能力是不公正的。董事会成员不能用仲裁条款作为对抗债权人发起责任诉讼的抗辩事由。

◎更名

China National Building Material Investment Co.，Ltd.v.BNK International LLC

(2009年，美国得克萨斯州西区地区法院)

2004年BNK公司和BND公司签订了一项代理合同。该合同规定与合同有关的争端，将交由中国香港国际仲裁中心来解决。在双方合同成立之后，BND改名为China National Building Material Investment Co.(China National)。2008年1月，China National根据代理合同，在中国香港国际仲裁中心申请了针对BNK的仲裁。裁决作出后，China National在美国申请执行。BNK向法院动议采取简易裁决的方式，拒绝执行仲裁裁决。但美国联邦地方法院得克萨斯西区法院批准了仲裁执行申请。

BNK的一项异议是，仲裁涉及的合同存在于BNK和BND之间，因此China National不是本案的适格当事人。法院认为这项异议的提出过晚。如果BNK认为China National不适格，那么在China National向香港国际仲裁中心提交仲裁申请时，BNK就有权利拒绝出庭，并向仲裁庭提交此项抗辩。相反，BNK在没有提出任何反对意见的前提下参与了仲裁，并且在仲裁的过程中，BNK还多次表示代理合同存在于BNK和China National之间。

→判决摘录

a.Standing

First，Defendant claims Plaintiff lacks standing to bring an action for enforcement of the arbitration award because(1)the original Agency Agreement was between Defendant and a company called BND，not Plaintiff，see Def.'s Mot.Summ.J.at p 3; and(2)Plaintiff has not presented the duly authenticated original award(or a certified copy)to the Court，as is required by article IV(1)of the New York Convention.The second point is moot as of the date of the hearing，at which counsel for Plaintiff submitted certified copies of the original Awards.Counsel for Defendant did not object to their authenticity.Thus，the Court turns to Defendant's first standing argument，concerning the difference(if any)between BND and Plaintiff.

Defendant claims BND，the other original party to the Agency Agreement，is actually a subsidiary of a company called“BNBM，”which in turn is a“platform”of Plaintiff.Def.'s Mot.Summ.J.at p 3.Defendant claims Plaintiff purports to act in the place of BND，but may not do so because it is not the same entity as BND.Thus，Defendant claims Plaintiff does not have standing to enforce the Agency Agreement against it.

In response，Plaintiff claims Defendant's objection is untimely and has been waived.See Pl.'s Suppl.［#22］at 2.Plaintiff is absolutely correct.Courts considering this matter have long held a party resisting an arbitration award must raise the defensethat it cannot be compelled to submit to arbitration by the opposing party before the arbitration award is made.See，e.g.Slaney v.The Intern.Amateur Athletic Federation，244 F.3d 580(7th Cir.2001);Nat'l Dev.Co.v.Khashoggi，781 F Supp 959，963(S.D.N.Y.1992)．For instance，in Staney，the Seventh Circuit admonished a party who argued at the enforcement stage there was no valid agreement to arbitrate between her and the party that sought to enforce its award，stating:

Our judicial system is not meant to provide a second bite at the apple for those who have sought adjudication of their disputes in other forums and are not content with the resolution they have received.［The defendant］had the opportunity to show that she had never agreed to arbitrate the dispute when she was notified of the arbitration，but she let that opportunity pass.［The defendant］could not sit back and allow the arbitration to go forward，and only after it was all done...say:oh by the way，we never agreed to the arbitration clause.That is a tactic that the law of arbitration，with its commitment to speed，will not tolerate.If a party willingly and without reservation allows an issue to be submitted to arbitration，he cannot await the outcome and then later argue that the arbitrator lacked authority to decide the matter.

244 F.3d at 591(emphasis added)(internal citations omitted)．Because the defendant in Staney had freely participated in the arbitration proceeding without raising the defense，the Seventh Circuit found it would be improper to invalidate the arbitral tribunal's award on the ground there was no written agreement.

The present case is remarkably similar.It is undisputed Defendant freely participated in the arbitration proceeding，in which Plaintiff was the“Applicant”，without ever raising the issue of whether Plaintiff could stand in the shoes of BND and enforce the Agency Agreement.All parties，including Defendant，assumed Plaintiff properly did so.Defendant specifically admitted during the course of the arbitration:“［Defendant］accepts that it owes the Applicant［defined as China National Building Material Investment Co.Ltd.f/k/a‘BND’］a sum of US$2 809 649.73.”See Pl.'s Suppl.at Ex.A(letter submitted by Defendant's counsel to the arbitration panel on August 15，2008)，p 7.

This admission was echoed throughout the entire arbitration process.For instance，Mr.Chang，Defendant's president，specifically admitted on December 1，2008，“［c］alculation by［Defendant］shows it owes the Applicant a sum of US$2 809 649 73.”Id.at Ex.B，p 2.Mr.Chang's entire written submission assumes the AgencyAgreement was an agreement between Defendant and Plaintiff(China National)．In short，the record is clear that during the entire arbitration proceeding Defendant made no objection to Plaintiff enforcing its rights under the Agency Agreement.Furthermore，even prior to the arbitration，in December of 2007，Defendant knew of Plaintiff's existence and wired funds to Plaintiff's bank account in accordance with the terms of the Agency Agreement.See id.at Ex.C(admitting these facts)．

Thus，it is only now—after Plaintiff has prevailed in arbitration and seeks to confirm the Awards issued in its favor—that Defendant raises for the first time its argument that BNK and Plaintiff are not one and the same entity，and Plaintiff therefore has no standing to enforce that Agreement against Defendant.A New York district court considered a similar circumstance in Data-Stream，in which the plaintiff petitioned the district court for confirmation of an arbitration award，and the defendant argued the plaintiff did not have standing to pursue confirmation of the award.Data-Stream AS/RS Techs.，LLC v.China Intern.Marine Containers，Ltd.，2003 WL 22519456 at*2－3(S.D.N.Y.2003)．The court reasoned that if the defendant truly believed its position，“it should have refused to participate in the arbitration and forced［the plaintiff］to bring a district court action to compel its participation.”Id.at*3.The defendant then could have asserted its belief it could not be forced to arbitrate by the plaintiff“in the appropriate forum at the appropriate juncture”:prior to the arbitration，in response to a motion to compel participation，rather than after a lengthy arbitration in opposition to a motion to confirm the arbitration award.Id.(citing In the Matter of Hidrocarburosy Derivados，C.A.，453 F.Supp.160，177(S.D.N.Y.1978))．The court concluded．

By actively participating and waiting until an award has been entered against it to complain to a district court，［the defendant］is essentially seeking a second bite at the apple.Were the Court to allow this to occur，it would undermine the twin goals of arbitration:efficient resolution of disputes and avoidance of costly litigation.

Id.

Exactly the same rationale applies to the present case.When Plaintiff China National served a notice of arbitration on Defendant，Defendant was at that point entitled to refuse to participate in the arbitration.If Defendant had truly believed Plaintiff and BND were not the same entity，it could have forced Plaintiff to bring a district court action to compel its participation in the arbitration.Thus the objection toPlaintiff's standing would have been raised in the appropriate forum at the appropriate juncture:prior to the arbitration in an action to compel arbitration.See Khashoggi，781 F.Supp.at 963(“The time for［the defendant in an action to enforce an arbitration award］to argue that he could not be compelled to submit to arbitration...was in［the］action to compel him to arbitrate.”)．To allow Defendant to raise this argument now would essentially render international arbitration proceedings frivolous.It would enable a party to allow arbitration to proceed without ever raising the issue of the applicant's standing，and even to admit it owed money to the applicant，but then to challenge the arbitration award when the applicant seeks to enforce it in the United States.The reliability of international arbitration awards would be totally undermined，and the goal of efficient and costeffective resolution of disputes would be forever frustrated，were such behavior encouraged by district courts in the United States.

In accordance with the foregoing reasoning，the Court finds Defendant's objection to Plaintiff's standing should not be reached on its merits by this Court，as the objection is untimely and has been waived by Defendant's conduct.At the very least，Defendant's consistent representation throughout the arbitration proceeding that Defendant owed Plaintiff money under the terms of the Agency Agreement，and its failure to raise its concerns about whether BND and Plaintiff were one and the same，compel this holding. See Pl.'s Suppl.at Exs.A-C.Defendant's motion for summary judgment is therefore DENIED on this ground，as there is no genuine issue of material fact on the issue of Plaintiff's standing to seek confirmation of the Awards in this Court.

◎被执行人破产

Metallurgtrans LLC v.PromoTrans Company LLC

(2009年，俄罗斯联邦仲裁法院)

申请人在俄国法院申请执行乌克兰裁决。裁决书裁决败诉方支付950万美元。被申请人尚在破产程序中。一审法院根据俄罗斯仲裁程序法的规定，认定请求所项属于破产程序中的事项，暂不对申请人提出的请求作出决定。申请人认为，俄罗斯仲裁程序法的相关规定仅涉及普通的诉讼程序，而不能适用于执行。该观点被驳回。

最高法院维持了下级法院的观点，并重申，在仲裁裁决项下的债务人面临破产，裁决仅能在破产程序中适用适当的程序规则予以执行。债权人需要申请列入债权人名录，并仅在所有破产费用、工资、运营费用等相关费用已经支付之后才可能得到偿还。

Jozef Syska＆Elektrim v. Vivendi Universal S.A.＆Others

(2009年，英国上诉法院)

第二申请人为波兰公司，将其在某公司的股份售予两被申请人，双方合同包括一伦敦仲裁条款。争议发生后，双方进行仲裁，但在2007年8月庭审之前，第二申请人被宣布破产，第一申请人被任命为破产管理人。随后，第二申请人去函仲裁庭，称根据波兰法律，仲裁协议被撤销。2007年10月，仲裁庭在伦敦开庭审理申请人提出的仲裁程序应予终止的主张。仲裁庭驳回申请人的主张。

申请人向高等法院申请撤销仲裁庭的认定，认为根据根据欧盟关于破产程序的条例，在欧盟一成员国进行的仲裁程序中，一方当事人在不同的成员国破产的，则该破产的结果应根据破产程序进行国的法律决定。法院认为，如果当事人被宣布为在一个成员国破产时，尚在另一成员国有未结之仲裁，则应以仲裁所在成员国的法律为准。因而，本案中破产对仲裁的影响应由英国法律确定，因为仲裁是在英国进行的。

◎揭开公司面纱

Abener Energia＆Sunopta v.Sunopta＆Abener Energia

(2009年，加拿大安大略高等法院)

原告与被告签订了一份合同，其中包括仲裁条款;原告还与被告所属集团的另一公司签订另一份合同。后原告与被告之间发生争议进行仲裁，裁决有利于被告。而原告与被告所属集团另一公司之间的另一仲裁案尚未开庭。被告向加拿大法院申请执行裁决，原告要求中止，理由是被告及被告所属集团的另一公司事实上只是两个分身，故原告具有衡平权利进行抵押，法院应当揭开公司面纱，否则与公共政策不符。

法院认为:本案并不符合揭开公司面纱的标准，被告需对被告所属集团的另一公司具有完全的控制权，且后者需构成文件欺诈或屏却被告非法行为的责任，但在本案中，二者事实上是独立的主体，且并未用于欺诈或不适当的目的。即使二者为分身，原告也不享有衡平上的抵消权利，其先履行裁决并不会受到损害。因而，允许执行裁决不会造成不公。即便构成衡平上的抵消权利，也不会违反公共政策。

→判决摘录

［18］In order to pierce the corporate veil，two factors must be established:(1)the alter ego must exercise complete control over the corporation or corporations whose separate legal identity is to be ignored;and(2)the corporation or corporations whose separate legal identity is to be ignored must be instruments of fraud or a mechanism to shield the alter ego from its liability for illegal activity:Transamerica Life Insurance Co.v.Canada Life Assurance Co.(1996)，28 O.R.(3d)423(S.C.J.)，aff'd［1997］O.J.No.3754(C.A.);Haskett v.Equifax Inc.，(2003)，224 D.L.R.(4^th)419(Ont.C.A.);Gregorio v.Intrans-Corp.(1994)，18 O.R.(3d) 527(C.A.)．

［19］In the case at bar，the evidence falls far short of establishing that Abener and the associated corporations are alter egos.They are not mere corporate puppets，and rather they appear to function with independence and with their own corporate identities and leadership.There is no evidence that they were incorporated or were being used for a fraudulent or improper purpose or were being used to shield another entity from liability for improper activities.Thus，SunOpta's best argument fails at the starting gate.

［20］Assuming，however，that the evidence did make a case for piercing the corporate veil，SunOpta's best argument then depends upon it showing that it has an equitable set-off.The test for the defence of equitable set-off requires that:(a)there is some equitable ground for the defendant being protected against the plaintiff's demands;(b)the equitable ground must go to the root of the plaintiff's claim;and(c)the defendant's set-off claim must be so clearly connected with the demand of the plaintiff that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the plaintiff to enforce payment without taking into consideration the cross-claim.See Algoma Steel Inc.v.Union Gas Ltd.，(2003)，63 O.R.(3d)78(C.A.)．

［21］For present purposes，I will assume that Abener and the associated companies are alter egos and that SunOpta's claim in the American Arbitration is sufficiently connected with the circumstances of the Spanish arbitral award.I will even assume that SunOpta will succeed in the American Arbitration proceeding.Making all these assumptions，it would not be manifestly unjust to allow Abener to enforce its arbitration award.There is no evidence whatsoever that SunOpta will suffer any prejudice from having to pay the arbitral award and then recover the full amount of the award made in the Arbitration proceedings and thus for a second reason SunOpta's best argument fails.