5.中美关系及国际体系的前景 China-U.S.Relations and the Future of the International System[168]
本节导读
自1979年中美正式建交以来，由于在历史、文化传统、社会制度、意识形态以及价值观念等方面的巨大差异，两国的关系曾出现多次波折和摩擦，但保持了总体稳定，取得了很大的发展。美国和中国分别是发达国家和发展中国家中最具影响力的两个大国，随着中国综合国力和国际影响力的不断增强，21世纪的中美关系无疑是国际关系中最重要的一对双边关系，其发展方向和稳定程度将对世界政治、经济产生深远影响。随着21世纪向前推进，中美关系将如何发展？
本文节选自《当中国统治世界：中国的崛起和西方世界的衰落》，该书集中探讨了21世纪中国崛起对世界的思想影响。对于其富有争议性的书名，该书作者英国学者马丁·雅克在中文版自序中解释：“中国的崛起对世界不是一种威胁”，所谓的“统治”，表现在中国将会是一股强大的力量在国际舞台发挥影响力。选文中，作者强调了中美关系30多年以来的总体稳定性和持续性，将中美两国各自对彼此关系的重视程度进行了对比，并认为随着21世纪国际形势的发展以及中美力量对比的变化，中美关系可能将迎来重大调整。虽说对话与合作是中美两国关系的主流，但作者认为在中美贸易、东亚地缘政治、中国模式的影响力、中国军事现代化、气候改变等议题上的摩擦将会加剧。最后，作者也展望了国际体系的未来发展，并强调了中国在建立公正合理的国际新秩序中发挥的作用。
THE RISING SUPERPOWER AND THE DECLINING SUPERPOWER
While the domestic debate in the United States might often suggest the contrary,ever since the Mao-Nixon rapprochement[169]of 1972 and the subsequent establishment of full diplomatic relations in 1979,the relationship between China and US has been characterized for almost four decades by stability and continuity. Although it has been through many phases—the axis against the Soviet Union,the reform period and modernization,Tiananmen Square and its aftermath,China’s rapid growth and its turn outwards in the late 1990s,the rise of Chinese nationalism,and of course a succession of US presidents from Nixon and Reagan to Carter and Clinton—the relationship has remained on an even keel[170],with the United States gradually granting China access both to its domestic market and the institutions of the international system,and China in return tempering and dovetailing its actions and behaviour in deference to American attitudes.The rationale that has been used to justify the US position has been through various iterations during the course of these different phases,but there has been no shrinking from the underlying approach.It may not be immediately obvious why the US ruling elite has been so consistently supportive of this position,but the key reason surely lies in its origins.The Mao-Nixon rapprochement was reached in the dark days of the Cold War and represented a huge geopolitical coup for the United States in its contest with the Soviet Union.That created a sense of ongoing loyalty and commitment to the relationship with China that helped to ensure its endurance.
China’s relationship with the United States has remained the fundamental tenet of its foreign policy for some thirty years,being from the outset at the heart of Deng Xiaoping’s strategy for ensuring that China would have a peaceful and relatively trouble-free external environment that would allow it to concentrate its efforts and resources on its economic development.After Tiananmen Square,Deng spoke of the need to‘adhere to the basic line for one hundred years,with no vacillation’[171],testimony to the overriding[172]importance he attached to economic development and,in that context,also to the relationship with the United States.It was,furthermore,a demonstration of the extraordinarily long-term perspective which,though alien to other cultures,is strongly characteristic of Chinese strategic thinking.The relationship with the United States has continued to be an article of faith[173]for the Chinese leadership throughout the reform period,largely unanimous and uncontested,engendering over time a highly informed and intimate knowledge of America.
The contrast between China’s approach towards the United States and that of the Soviet Union’s prior to 1989 could hardly be greater.The USSR saw the West as the enemy;China chose,after 1972,to befriend it.The Soviet Union opted for[174]autarchy[175]and isolation;China,after 1978,sought integration and interdependence. The USSR shunned,and was excluded from,membership of such post-war Western institutions as the IMF,the World Bank and GATT;in contrast,China waited patiently for fifteen years until it was finally admitted as a member of the WTO in 2001.The Soviet Union embarked on military confrontation and a zero-sum relationship with the United States;China pursued rapprochement and cooperation in an effort to create the most favourable conditions for its economic growth.The Soviet Union was obliged to engage in prohibitive levels of military expenditure;China steadily reduced the proportion of GDP spent on its military during the 1980s and 1990s,falling from an average of 6.35 per cent between 1950 and 1980 to 2.3 per cent in the 1980s and 1.4 per cent in the 1990s.The strategies of the two countries were,in short,based on diametrically opposed[176]logics.The Chinese approach is well illustrated by Deng’s comment:‘Observe developments soberly, maintain our position,meet challenges calmly,hide our capacities and bide our time,remain free of ambition,never claim leadership.’[177]It goes without saying that the relationship between China and the United States during the reform period has been profoundly unequal.China needed the US to a far greater extent than the US needed China.The United States possessed the world’s largest market and was the gatekeeper to an international system the design and operation of which it was overwhelmingly responsible for.China was cast in the role of supplicant[178],or,as China expert Steven I.Levine puts it,the United States acted towards China‘like a self-appointed Credentials Committee[179]that had the power to accept,reject,or grant probationary[180]membership in the international club to an applicant of uncertain respectability’.In the longer term,when China is far stronger,this rather demeaning[181]experience might find expression—and payback—in the Chinese attitude towards the United States;it might be seen by them to have been another,albeit milder,expression of their long-running humiliation.
Compared with China’s huge investment in its relationship with the United States,the American attitude towards China,so far at least,stands in striking contrast.Its relationship with China has been seen by the US as one of only many international relationships,and usually far from the most important.As a result, American attention towards China has been episodic,occasionally rising to near the top of the agenda,but for the most part confined to the middle tier.During the first Clinton administration,for example,China barely figured.Although George W. Bush made strong noises against China during his first presidential election campaign,describing it as a‘strategic competitor’,China sank down the Washington pecking order after 9/11 and relations between the two rapidly returned to the status quo ante[182].In line with the differential investment by the two powers in their relationship,China’s impressive knowledge of the United States is not reciprocated in Washington beyond a relatively small coterie[183].Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the passing of the Cold War,the US was obliged to rethink the rationale for its relationship with China.It was not difficult.With its embrace of the market and growing privatization[184],China was seen,not wrongly,as moving towards capitalism.Furthermore,given China’s double-digit economic growth and its huge population,it was regarded as offering boundless opportunities for US business. China became a key element in the American hubris[185]about globalization in the 1990s,an integral part of what was seen as a process of Westernization which would culminate in the inevitable worldwide victory of Western capitalism,with the rest of the world,including China,increasingly coming to resemble the United States.Many assumptions were wrapped up in this hubris,from the triumph of Western lifestyles and cultural habits to the belief that Western-style democracy was of universal and inevitable applicability.George W.Bush declared in November 1999:‘Economic freedom creates habits of liberty.And habits of liberty create expectations of democracy…Trade freely with China,and time is on our side.’Or as Thomas Friedman wrote:‘China’s going to have a free press.Globalization will drive it.’It was regarded as axiomatic[186],American author James Mann suggests, that,‘the Chinese are inevitably becoming like us’.This view,which is still widely held,burdens American policy towards China with exaggerated expectations that cannot possibly be fulfilled.The idea of globalization which lay at its heart was profoundly flawed.
During the course of the 1990s,US policy towards China was assailed by a growing range of different interest groups,from the labour unions which,concerned about the huge increase in Chinese imports,criticized China’s trade practices,to human rights groups that protested about the treatment of dissidents and the subjugation of Tibet.While China policy remained a presidential rather than a congressional matter,it was relatively invulnerable to the critics’complaints.However,it should not be assumed that the present American position towards China will inevitably be maintained into the indefinite future.Until the turn of the century,China impinged little on the conduct of American foreign policy,apart from in East Asia,and that was largely confined to the question of Taiwan.True,China’s exports to the United States—combined with the lack of competitiveness of the US’s own exports—had combined to produce a huge trade deficit[187]between the two countries,but this was mitigated by China’s purchase of US Treasury bonds,which fuelled the American credit boom,and the benefit that American consumers enjoyed from the availability of ultra—cheap manufactured goods from China.But as China began to spread its wings at the beginning of the new century—its economy still growing at undiminished pace,the trade gap between the two countries constantly widening,the amount of Treasury bonds held by China forever on the increase,Chinese companies being urged to invest abroad,the state—sponsored quest for a sufficient and reliable supply of natural commodities drawing the country into Africa,Central Asia and Latin America,and its power and influence in East Asia expanding apace—it became increasingly clear that China no longer occupied the same niche[188]as it had previously: across many continents and in many countries,the United States found itself confronted with a growing range of Chinese interests and,as a result,a steady growth in the sources of potential disagreement and conflict between the two countries.
No sooner had the new century begun than two developments suggested that a major change in their relationship was likely,even though it did not appear immediately obvious that this was the case.First,the Bush administration abandoned the previously consensual multilateralist[189]US foreign policy in favour of a unilateralist[190]policy that,amongst other things,embraced the principle of pre-emptive strike[191]. The US turned away from its previous espousal of universalism and towards a nationalism which denied or down-played the need for alliances.The new strategy placed a priority on military strength and hard as opposed to soft power,a position made manifest[192]in 2003 with the invasion of Iraq.The principle of national sovereignty was subordinated to the desirability of intervention for the purpose of regime-change[193].A new and aggressive America was born.In the event,an overwhelming majority of nation-states opposed the invasion of Iraq and,according to global opinion polls,an even more decisive majority of their citizens.As the occupation faced growing opposition and was perceived to have failed,the United States became unpopular to an extent not seen in the sixty years since the Second World War.Second,around 2003-5,the moment of China arrived,as global awareness of its transformation,and the meaning and effects of that transformation for the rest of the world,suddenly began to dawn.By accident,these two developments happened to coincide,thereby serving to accentuate[194]their impact.It was widely acknowledged that China was on the rise and there was a slow dawning that the US was not as omnipotent as had previously been thought.There was a growing perception that the balance of power between the two countries was starting to shift in China’s favour.The mood in the United States towards China grew more uncertain.James Mann,in his book The China Fantasy,challenged what he described as the‘Soothing Scenario’,namely the consensus which holds that engaging with China through trade will be to the political and economic advantage of the United States and will ultimately result in a free-market,democratic China.Mann argued that,notwithstanding China’s market transformation,it by no means automatically followed that China would become democratic.
The general mood of uncertainty and unease was accentuated by the credit crunch[195]which started in summer 2007 and which a year later brought the American financial sector to its knees,with illustrious names like Lehman Brothers[196]going bankrupt and the few remaining American investment banks forced to renounce their status—Goldman Sachs[197],the favoured bank of recent US administrations,amongst them.In an extraordinary volte-face[198],the government announced a huge bail-out[199]of the financial sector,marking the demise of the deregulated neo-liberal regime which had been the calling card[200]of American capitalism since the late 1970s.In a few spectacular weeks the Anglo-American model had imploded,plunging the Western economies into a serious recession.The fact that the US had been living well beyond its means—and relying on Chinese credit in order to do so—underlined both the fallibility of American prosperity and the shift in the centre of economic gravity from the United States to China.
GROWING CONFLICT
There are a number of issues that seem likely to shape US attitudes towards China and increase the possibility of conflict between the two countries.
The first concerns American attitudes towards globalization.In the 1990s globalization was seen in the US as a win-win situation,a process by which the US left its imprint on,and gained advantage in its relationship with,the rest of the world.In effect,it was something that the United States exported to the world and then reaped the benefits from at home.Now,however,globalization is seen more and more like a boomerang that is returning to haunt the US.Previously,the US was regarded as the overwhelming agent and beneficiary of globalization.Now the main beneficiary is perceived to be East Asia,and especially China.Through globalization,China has transformed itself into a formidable competitor of the United States,with its huge trade surplus[201],its massive ownership of US Treasury bonds,its consequent power over the value of the dollar,and the fact that it has undermined key sectors of American manufacturing industry,with growing numbers of workers being made redundant.The widening controversy over the value of the renminbi,the safety of Chinese exports such as food and toys,and the frequent accusations of‘unfair’competition,are a reflection of growing sensitivity towards China.This is not to suggest that the balance of American opinion has shifted significantly as yet.The winners,above all the US corporate giants that have moved their manufacturing operations to China and the consumers who have benefited from China prices at home,still considerably outnumber the losers and in any case enjoy much greater power.But this could change.The political consequences of spiralling commodity prices,especially oil prices,which were brought to a premature end by the credit crunch,could,if they had continued,have turned American attitudes towards China in a more negative direction.More pertinently,the threat of a serious and prolonged depression is already leading to growing demands for protection.It is striking that,even before the credit crunch,the number of Americans who thought that trade with other countries was having a positive impact on the US fell sharply from 78 per cent in 2002 to only 59 per cent in 2007.
In the longer term,as Chinese companies relentlessly climb the technology ladder,the US economy will face ever-widening competition from Chinese goods,no longer just at the low-value end,but also increasingly for high valueadded products as well,just as happened earlier with Japanese and Korean firms.In that process,the proportion of losers is likely to increase rapidly,as will be the case in Europe too.Such a development could undermine the present consensus in support of free-trade globalization and result in a turn towards protectionism[202],the most important target of which would be Chinese imports. The impact of the depression,however,suggests that this process may already be happening.If the United States did resort to protectionism,one of the key planks[203]in the Sino-American relationship since the early eighties would be undermined.It would also signal a more general move towards protectionism worldwide and the end of the phase of globalization that was ushered in at the end of the 1970s.The failure of the Doha round[204]is a further indication that this kind of scenario is possible.
This brings us next to East Asia.There is clear evidence,as discussed in the last chapter,of a fairly dramatic shift in the balance of power in what is now the most important economic region in the world,East Asia having overtaken both North America and Europe.Nothing decisive has happened but nonetheless China has palpably strengthened its position,with even established US allies like Singapore and the Philippines now hedging[205]and seeking a closer accommodation with China.Only Japan and Taiwan,in fact,have tried to resist being drawn closer to China,though both have become deeply involved with China economically.Furthermore,it is clear that,notwithstanding the presence of a large number of its troops,the American position on the Korean Peninsula has weakened as South Korea has moved much closer to China and the US has been forced to depend on China playing the role of honest broker[206]in defusing the nuclear crisis in the North.The wider significance of these developments in terms of Sino-US relations is that East Asia has,ever since the last war,been a predominantly American sphere of influence,threatened only by a relatively isolated China during the Maoist period and,of course,the US’s defeat in the Vietnam War.This can no longer be presumed to be the case.East Asia is now effectively bipolar.The fact that the US’s position in East Asia has declined could well have knock-on effects[207]for its commitment to Taiwan,potentially even undermining it.The waning[208]of American influence in East Asia also has implications for its position globally,on the one hand serving to embolden China and on the other acting as a marker and signal for other nations.As yet,there is little sign of any clear American response to these trends,although the Obama administration seems to recognize their importance.The US has been hugely distracted by its entanglement in the Middle East and,as a consequence,has neglected its position in East Asia.
China,meanwhile,has slowly begun to emerge as an alternative model to the United States,a view which the Chinese have cautiously promoted,though in a manner very different from the kind of systemic competition that characterized the Cold War.The growing American emphasis on hard power,especially since 2003, has made it increasingly unpopular in the world and created a vacuum which China in a small way has started to fill,not least with its embrace of multilateralism and its emphasis on its peaceful rise.China’s pitch[209]is essentially to the developing rather than the developed world,with its offer of no-strings-attached[210]aid and infrastructural assistance,its respect for sovereignty,its emphasis on a strong state,its opposition to superpower domination and its championing[211]of a level playing field.As a package these have a powerful resonance with developing countries.The main plank of American soft power is the stress placed on the importance of democracy within nation-states:China,by way of contrast,emphasises democracy between nation-states—most notably in terms of respect for sovereignty—and democracy in the world system.China’s criticism of the Western-dominated international system and its governing institutions strikes a strong chord with the developing world at a time when these institutions are widely recognized to be unrepresentative and seriously flawed.Most powerfully of all,China can offer its own experience of growth as an example and model for other developing countries to consider and learn from,something that the United States,as the doyen[212]of developed countries,cannot.East Asia apart,there has been a significant shift of power and sentiment away from the United States and towards China in Africa and Latin America.This should not be exaggerated—it remains embryonic[213]—but it is, nonetheless,significant.Meanwhile the spectacular collapse of the neoliberal model in the financial meltdown has seriously undermined the wider appeal of the United States,notwithstanding the exhilarating and uplifting effect of Barack Obama’s election as president.And the fact,more generally,that the American-run international economic system has been plunged into such turmoil as a result of a crisis which had its origins in the United States has served further to accentuate the loss of American power and prestige.
Finally,there is the question of China’s military strength.This has been persistently highlighted by the United States.The Americans attach greater emphasis to military power than anything else,a position which is reflected in their continuing huge military expenditure and the importance they place on maintaining overwhelming[214]military strength in relation to the rest of the world.In the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America,such massive military expenditure is advocated in order to‘dissuade[215]potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing,or equalling,the power of the United States’.The fact is that American unipolarity is overwhelmingly a military phenomenon.
The American argument that China is determined to develop a strong military capacity of its own,beyond what is needed in the context of Taiwan,plays on[216]the fears of many nations,especially in East Asia.China’s size and cohesiveness, together with its history of authoritarian rule,arouse doubts enough in the minds of others,so the suspicion that China is also embarked on becoming a military superpower could help to tip the balance of perception towards something closer to paranoia.The political purpose behind the annual Pentagon statements on China’s military spending,as well as the not infrequent warnings from members of the Bush administration,has been to create a mood of doubt and distrust,playing in part on old Cold War fears about the Soviet Union.In fact China,as we have seen,has hitherto opted for a different path,one that emphasizes economic growth rather than military capacity.Although it has undertaken a major modernization of its armed forces,the twin objects of this have been to ensure that China can respond by force if necessary to any declaration of independence by Taiwan,and to pose a sufficient deterrent[217]to any external power that might otherwise contemplate attacking China.Both of these are long-established concerns,the first a product of the civil war,the second a function of China’s‘century of humiliation’and its overriding concern for its national sovereignty.China’s ability to develop a powerful military is also seriously constrained by the fact that its own technological level remains relatively low and that its only source of foreign arms, given the EU embargo and the US ban,is Russia.As a result,China is much weaker militarily than Japan.It still does not even possess an aircraft carrier[218],a crucial means of power-projection,unlike ten other countries in the world that do—including the UK,which has three.True,as China’s power grows in East Asia and it acquires new responsibilities and commitments there and elsewhere,its military strength is likely to expand in tandem[219],but how much and in what ways is difficult to predict.
The danger is that at some point the United States and China will be drawn into the kind of arms race that characterized the Cold War and which produced such a climate of fear.There is no doubt that the United States feels rather more comfortable on the terrain of hard power than China,first because its military superiority is overwhelming and secondly because the language of hard power is deeply inscribed on the American psyche—partly as a result of the Cold War and partly as a consequence of the violent manner of the country’s birth and expansion,as exemplified by the frontier spirit—in a way that it is not on the Chinese.But there are dangers here for the United States too.The fundamental problem of China for the US is not its military strength but its economic prowess[220].This is what is slowly and irresistibly eroding American global pre-eminence.If the US comes to see China as primarily a military issue then it will be engaging in an act of self-deception which will divert its attention from addressing the real problems that it faces and in effect hasten the process of its own decline.
These four issues—the United States’attitude towards globalization;the shift in the balance of power in East Asia;China’s emergence as an alternative model to the US;and the issue of military power—do not lie at some distant point in the future but are already beginning to unfold;nor do they exhaust the likely areas of friction[221].As China’s power and ambitions grow apace,the points of conflict and difference between the US and China will steadily accumulate.Such is the speed of China’s transformation that this could happen more rapidly than we might expect or the world is prepared for:China-time passes rather more quickly than the kind of time that we are historically accustomed to.It is not difficult to imagine what some of these points of difference might be:growing competition and conflict over the sources of energy supplies—in Angola or Venezuela,or wherever;an intensifying dispute over the expanding strategic partnership between the United States and India;Chinese firms,awash with cash,threatening to take over American firms and provoking a hostile reaction(as happened in the case of the oil firm Unocal[222]);the Chinese sovereign wealth fund,its coffers filled with the country’s huge trade surplus,seeking to acquire a significant stake in US firms that are regarded as of strategic importance;and a pattern of growing skirmishes[223]over the militarization of space.Moreover,China being culturally so different from the United States,in a way that was not nearly as true of the USSR,only adds to the possibility of mutual misunderstanding and resentment.Furthermore the fact that China is ruled by a Communist Party will always act as a powerful cause of difference as well as an easy source of popular demonization in the US,with memories of the Cold War still vivid.Any serious,protracted depression could serve to heighten the prospect of friction as countries,in the face of stagnant living standards and rising unemployment,become increasingly protectionist amidst a rising tide of nationalist sentiment.
Potentially overshadowing all these issues in the longer run is the growing threat of climate change and the need for the world to take drastic[224]action to reduce carbon emissions.Under the Bush administration the United States adopted a unilateralist position on this question,refusing to be party to the Kyoto Protocol or accept the near-universal body of scientific opinion.As a developing country,China was not required to sign the Kyoto agreement,but now that it is the largest emitter of greenhouse gases its exclusion is unsupportable from a planetary point of view.Any new climate treaty will be meaningless unless it includes the United States,China and India.But any agreement—involving inevitable conflict between the interests of the developing countries on the one hand and the developed on the other,with China the key protagonist[225]for the former and the United States for the latter—will be very difficult.
The problem for the United States,meanwhile,is that China’s relative economic power,on which all else depends,continues to grow in comparison with that of the US.
THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
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The present international system is designed primarily to represent and promote American interests.As China’s power grows,together with that of other outsiders like India,the United States will be obliged to adapt the system and its institutions to accommodate their demands and aspirations,but,as demonstrated by the slowness of reform in the IMF and even the G8,there is great reluctance on the part of both the US and Europe.Fundamental to this has been the desire to retain these institutions for the promotion of Western interests and values.For example,after China and Russia vetoed the Anglo-American bid to impose sanctions on the Zimbabwe president Robert Mugabe and some of his regime in July 2008,the US ambassador to the UN,Zalmay Khalilzad,stated that Russia’s veto raised‘questions about its reliability as a G8 partner’.From late 2008 there was much talk of a new Bretton Woods[226],but any such agreement would require far more fundamental reform than the West has hitherto entertained.At present the Bretton Woods institutions—he IMF and the World Bank—are dominated by the Western powers.The US still has 17.1 per cent of the quotas(which largely determine the votes)and the European Union an additional 32.4 per cent in the IMF as of May 2007,while China had just 3.7 per cent and India 1.9 per cent.If these institutions are to be revived as a result of any new agreement,the West will have to cede[227]a large slice of its power to countries like China and India.China,after all,is hardly likely to put very large resources at the disposal of the IMF unless it has a major say in how they are used,as Premier Wen Jiabao has made clear.Should reform remain reluctant,partial and ultimately inadequate,then the international system is likely over time to become increasingly bifurcated[228],with the Western-sponsored bodies abandoning any claim to universality in favour of the pursuit of sectional interest,while a new Chinese-supported system begins to take shape alongside.
The American international relations scholar G.John Ikenberry has argued that because the‘Western-centred system…is open,integrated,and rule-based,with wide and deep foundations’,‘it is hard to overturn and easy to join’:in other words,it is far more resilient[229]and adaptable than previous systems and therefore is likely to be reformed from within rather than replaced.This is possible,but perhaps more likely is a twin-track process:first,the gradual but reluctant and inadequate reform of existing Western-centric institutions in the face of the challenge from China and others;and second,in the longer term,the creation of new institutions sponsored and supported by China but also embracing other rising countries such as India and Brazil.As an illustration of reform from within,in June 2008 Justin Lin Yifu[230]became the first Chinese chief economist at the World Bank,a position which previously had been the exclusive preserve of Americans and Europeans.In the long term,though,China is likely to operate both within and outside the existing international system,seeking to transform that system while at the same time,in effect,sponsoring a new China-centric international system which will exist alongside the present system and probably slowly begin to usurp it.The United States will bitterly resist the decline of an international system from which it benefits so much:as a consequence,any transition will inevitably be tense and conflictual.Just as during the interwar period British hegemony gave way to competing sterling,dollar and franc areas,American hegemony may also be replaced,in the first instance, at least,by competing regional spheres of influence.It is possible to imagine,as the balance of power begins to shift decisively in China’s favour,a potential division of the world into American and Chinese spheres of influence,with East Asia and Africa,for example,coming under Chinese tutelage[231],and forming part of a renminbi area,while Europe and the Middle East remain under the American umbrella.In the longer run,though,such arrangements are unlikely to be stable in a world which has become so integrated.
思考题
1.What have been the respective attitudes of China and the US towards Sino-US relations in the author’s opinion?
2.How did China’s approach towards the US differ from that of the USSR?
3.What are the two developments in the beginning years of the 21st century that might suggest a major change in Sino-US relations?
4.In what issue areas will there be growing conflicts between China and the US?
5.How does the author envision the future of the international system?
【注释】
[1]From Charles W.Kegley,Jr.,World Politics:Trend and Transformation,11th Edition,Wadsworth Publishing,2008,5-8.
[2]convulsion,震动。
[3]confines,范围、界限。
[4]episodic,插曲的、不定期发生的。
[5]spike,图表中曲线的尖头部分。
[6]cascade,小瀑布，一连串的进展。
[7]disintegrative,使分裂的、使瓦解的。
[8]resurgence,复活、复苏。
[9]portend,预示着。
[10]watershed,分水岭。
[11]Stanley Hoffmann,斯坦利·霍夫曼，美国著名国际政治学者，哈佛大学教授，1968年创办哈佛大学西欧研究中心，编著《当代国际关系理论》（1960）等。
[12]supranational,超国家的、超民族的。
[13]cone,锥体、锥形。
[14]cleavage,分裂，裂缝。
[15]hierarchy,层次、层级。
[16]asymmetry,不对称。
[17]perpetuation,长存。
[18]déjà vu,似曾经历、似曾相见。
[19]见Marvin J.Cetron与Owen Davies撰写、世界未来学会（World Future Society）出版的特别报告53 Trends Now Shaping the Future，该报告随后的修订版增加了两大“发展趋势”。
[20]From Katherine L.Lynch,The Forces of Economic Globalization:Challenges to the Regime of International Commercial Arbitration,Kluwer Law International,2003，pp.49-64.
[21]discourse,讨论、论述。
[22]displace,替换、替代。
[23]prerogative,特权。
[24]marginalize,边缘化。
[25]overstate,夸大。
[26]thrust,本质、要点、核心。
[27]archaic,古老的、过时的。
[28]fragmented,成碎片的、分割开的。
[29]delegate,授权。
[30]majoritarianism,多数主义。
[31]Roland Robertson,罗兰·罗伯逊，以社会学角度来理解和关注全球化问题的代表性学者之一，将“全球本土化”（glocalization）概念引入西方学界，代表作为Globalization:Social Theory and Global Culture(1992)。
[32]refute,反驳。
[33]myopic,短视的、近视的。
[34]compelling,非常有说服力的。
[35]international legal sovereignty,国际法理主权。
[36]defect,缺点、缺陷。
[37]Eric Helleiner,埃里克·赫莱纳，加拿大滑铁卢大学政治学教授，对国际货币、金融等议题有深入研究，就相关领域发表了不少见解独到的论文。
[38]deregulation,解除管制，撤销控制。
[39]credit ratingagency,信用评级机构。
[40]territoriality,领土属性。
[41]unraveling,解开、松开、拆开，这里指的是与主权密切相关的领土属性的重要性下降。
[42]denationalization,去国有化。
[43]Saskia Sassen,萨斯基娅·萨森，著名社会学家和经济学家，以其对全球化和国际间人类迁移的研究而著称，曾提出“世界城市”（globalcity）概念，指在社会、经济、文化或政治层面直接影响全球事务的城市。
[44]offshore,离岸的、在海外建立税率较低的。
[45]Bermuda,百慕大群岛，位于北大西洋西部，是自治英属殖民地。
[46]Jersey,海峡群岛——泽西岛，位于法国西海岸，英吉利海峡南端，是英国属地。
[47]Guernsey,海峡群岛——根西岛，位于法国西海岸，英吉利海峡南端，是英国属地。
[48]Basle Accord,《巴塞尔协议》，巴塞尔银行监管委员会制定的一系列银行监管规定。
[49]static,静止的、静态的。
[50]reciprocity,互惠。
[51]James Rosenau,詹姆斯·罗西瑙，乔治·华盛顿大学国际事务和政治科学教授，美国国际研究协会前主席，是世界知名的国际政治理论家，著作颇丰，包括Turbulence in World Politics:A The ory of Change and Continuity(1990)、Alongthe Domestic-Foreign Frontier:Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World(1997)、Distant Proximities:Dynamics Beyond Globalization(2003)等。
[52]localization,本土化、地方化。
[53]Aristotle,亚里士多德（前384—前322年），古希腊斯吉塔拉人，世界古代史上最伟大的哲学家、科学家和教育家之一。
[54]Jean Bodin,让·博丹（1530—1596年），法国政治思想家、法学家，近代资产阶级主权学说的创始人，最重要的著作为《共和六书》（Les SixLivres de la République），这一著作奠定了近代政治科学的基础。
[55]Thomas Hobbes,托马斯·霍布斯（1588—1679年），英国政治学家、哲学家，国际政治领域现实主义流派奠基人之一，是近代第一个在自然法基础上系统发展了国家契约学说的资产阶级启蒙思想家，撰有经世名著《利维坦》（Leviathan）。
[56]Westphalian sovereignty,威斯特利亚主权。
[57]domestic sovereignty,国内主权。
[58]interdependence sovereignty,相互依赖主权。
[59]derogate,贬低、减损。
[60]redundant,多余的。
[61]diminution,减少、降低。
[62]herald,预示着。
[63]multi-faceted,多面的。
[64]contradiction,矛盾。
[65]proto-theory,原型理论。
[66]dualistic,二元的。
[67]state-centric,以国家为中心的。
[68]multi-centric,多中心的。
[69]MNC,Multi-national Corporation,跨国公司。
[70]From Audrey Kurth Cronin,“Behind the Curve:Globalization and International Terrorism”,International Security,Issue 3,Volume 27，Winter 2002/03.
[71]subjective,主观的、个人的。
[72]maim,使身体残缺、使残废。
[73]engender,产生、引起。
[74]precipitate,促成，加速……来临。
[75]inadvertently,无意地。
[76]precision-guided,精确制导的。
[77]attribute,属性、特征。
[78]Abu Sayyaf,阿布沙耶夫武装组织，是东南亚分离主义组织，其势力范围包括菲律宾南部岛屿。
[79]ethnonationalist,种族民主主义者；种族民主主义的。
[80]decolonization,非殖民地化。
[81]ephemeral,短暂的、短命的。
[82]opportunistic,机会主义的、机会主义者的。
[83]populace,平民、大众。
[84]egregious,异乎寻常的、极端恶劣的。
[85]Manichaean,摩尼教的，属于或与摩尼教有关的。
[86]infidel,无信仰者、异教徒。
[87]apostate,叛教者、变节者。
[88]secular,世俗的。
[89]egalitarian,平等主义的。
[91]harbinger,先驱、预示者。
[92]anomalous,不规则的、反常的。
[93]secularization,世俗化。
[94]onslaught,冲击。
[95]na觙vet伢,天真、幼稚。
[96]asymmetrical,不对称的。
[97]Christopher Coker,伦敦政治经济学院（LSE）国际关系教授，作品有War in an Age of Risk(2009)，The Future of War:The Re-Enchantment of War in the Twenty-First Century(2004)，Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century(2002)等。
[98]homogeneity,同质性、同质化。
[99]disenfranchised,被剥夺权利的。
[100]antipathy,憎恶、反感。
[101]vis-觓-vis,面对。
[102]repressive,压制的。
[103]pent-up,被压抑的。
[104]linear,线性的。
[105]CBNR,化、生、放、核（chemical,biological,radiological,and nuclear）。
[106]twofold,两部分的、双重的。
[107]power projection,力量投射。
[108]George Kennan,乔治·凯南（1904—2005年），美国前外交官、冷战时期最重要的外交战略家，“遏制政策”创始人。
[109]failed states,中央政府无法控制其领土并为其国民提供安全保障，无法提供有效的治理，无法提供公共商品如经济增长、教育和保健等的国家。
[110]laden,充满的。
[111]foreordained,注定的。
[112]From Jennifer Clapp and Peter Dauvergne,Paths toa Green World:The Political Economy of the Global Environment,the MITPress,2005，pp.26-43.
[113]polar,两极的、截然相反的。
[114]market liberal,市场自由主义者。
[115]institutionalist,制度主义者。
[116]bioenvironmentalist,生物环境主义者。
[117]social green,社会环境主义者。
[118]Bjorn Lomborg,丹麦作家、学者，关注全球环境问题和地球未来，2001年出版富有争议性的The Skeptical Environmentalist。
[119]Greenpeace,绿色和平组织。
[120]Worldwatch Institute,世界观察研究所，独立的国际性研究机构，成立于1974年，总部在美国华盛顿特区，研究领域包括气候与能源、食品与农业、绿色经济等。
[121]vested interests,既得利益。
[122]botulism,肉毒杆菌中毒，一种因食含有肉毒杆菌素的食物而引起的严重的、有时可致命的食物中毒。
[123]life expectancy,预期寿命、平均寿命。
[124]malnourished,营养失调的、营养不良的。
[125]antibiotics,抗生素。
[126]pasteurization,加热杀菌法、巴斯德杀菌法。
[127]causal,原因的、因果关系的。
[128]exponential,指数的、几何级数的。
[129]waste sink,垃圾填埋场。
[130]chlorofluorocarbon,氟氯化碳。
[131]cataract,白内障。
[132]exacerbate,使恶化、使加剧。
[133]the Nature Conservancy,大自然保护协会，成立于1951年，总部在美国，是国际上最大的非政府、非营利性的自然环境保护组织之一。
[134]cardiovascular disease,心血管病。
[135]pesticide,杀虫剂。
[136]homosapiens,智人（现代人的学名）。
[137]triple,增至三倍、成三倍增长。
[138]awash,充斥的、泛滥的。
[139]diversion,改道工程。
[140]dysentery,痢疾。
[141]cholera,霍乱。
[142]bleak,黯淡的、令人沮丧的。
[143]World Resources Institute,世界资源研究所，位于美国首都华盛顿特区的环境智库，创立于1982年。
[144]dispossession,剥夺。
[145]International Forumon Globalization,全球化国际论坛，研究经济全球化的文化、社会、政治和环境影响的机构。该机构对WTO、IMF、世界银行等全球治理机构持批判立场，于1994年组建。
[146]undernourished,营养不良的、半饱状态的。
[147]obesity,肥胖。
[148]malaria,疟疾。
[149]measles,麻疹。
[150]respiratory disease,呼吸道疾病。
[151]environmental degradation,环境退化。
[152]deflect,使偏离、使转向。
[153]prop,小道具。
[154]genetically altered,转基因的。
[155]DuPont,杜邦公司。
[156]phase out,逐步淘汰，逐步停止使用。
[157]methane,甲烷、沼气。
[158]nitrous oxide,一氧化二氮。
[159]desertification,（土壤）荒漠化、沙漠化。
[160]marginalized,边缘化的、脱离社会发展进程的。
[161]renewable energy,可再生能源。
[162]panacea,万能药，解决一切问题的方法。
[163]equitable,公平的、公正的。
[164]global commons,“全球公域”，超越国家主权和管辖范围，使一切人共同受益而存在的区域。
[165]per se,本身。
[166]node,节点。
[167]monoculture,单一文化。
[168]From Martin Jacques,When China Rules the World:The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World,Allen Lane/Penguin,2009，pp.346-362.
[169]rapprochement,（国家间）恢复友好关系，和睦。
[170]on an even keel,平稳的、稳定的。
[171]‘adhere to the basic line for one hundred years,with no vacillation’,即“坚持基本路线一百年不动摇”。
[172]overriding,最重要的、高于一切的。
[173]rticle of faith,信条、信念。
[174]opt for,选择。
[175]autarchy（=autarky）,自给自足。
[176]diametrically opposed,完全相反的。
[177]‘Observe developments soberly,maintain our position,meet challenges calmly,hide our capacities and bide our time,remain free of ambition,never claim leadership.’“冷静观察，站稳脚跟，沉着应付，韬光养晦，善于守拙，绝不当头”。
[178]supplicant,恳求者、恳请者。
[179]credentials committee,资格审查委员会。
[180]probationary,试用的、考验期的。
[181]demeaning,贬低的。
[182]status quoante,原状、以前的状况。
[183]coterie,（少数人组成的）小圈子。
[184]privatization,私有化。
[185]hubris,自大。
[186]axiomatic,不言自明的。
[187]trade deficit,贸易逆差。
[188]niche,位置、地位。
[189]multilateralist,多边主义的。
[190]unilateralist,单边主义的。
[191]pre-emptive strike,先发制人的打击。
[192]manifest,显然的、明显的。
[193]regime-change,“政权更迭”。
[194]accentuate,强调，使更明显。
[195]credit crunch,信贷紧缩，指经营贷款的金融机构提高贷款标准，以高于市场利率水平的条件发放贷款，甚至不愿发放贷款，从而导致信贷增长下降，信贷资金难以满足社会再生产的合理需求的现象。
[196]Lehman Brothers,雷曼兄弟公司，创办于1850年，是一家国际性金融机构及投资银行，环球总部设于美国纽约市，2008年受次贷危机波及而严重亏损，9月申请破产。
[197]Goldman Sachs,高盛集团，成立于1869年，是一家国际领先的投资银行和证券公司，总部设在纽约，向全球提供广泛的投资、咨询和金融服务。
[198]volte-face,向后转、大转变。
[199]bail-out,救市。
[200]callingcard,名片。
[201]trade surplus,贸易顺差、贸易盈余。
[202]protectionism,保护主义。
[203]plank,厚板，支撑物。
[204]Doha round,多哈回合谈判。
[205]hedge,对冲。
[206]broker,中间人。
[207]knock-on effect,撞击作用。
[208]wane,月亏，衰落。
[209]pitch,推销方式。
[210]no-strings-attached,无附带条件的。
[211]champion,为……而奋斗，拥护。
[212]doyen,老资格、老前辈。
[213]embryonic,胚胎的、初期的。
[214]overwhelming,压倒性的、无法抵抗的。
[215]dissuade,劝阻、阻止。
[216]playon/upon,利用，为自己的利益利用（别人的态度或感情）。
[217]deterrent,威慑。
[218]aircraft carrier,航空母舰。
[219]in tandem,一前一后地。
[220]prowess,威力。
[221]friction,摩擦。
[222]Unocal,加州联合油公司，美国一家中型综合石油公司，2005年该公司被雪佛龙公司（Chevron）并购，期间中国海洋石油总公司曾有竞购计划。
[223]skirmish,小冲突。
[224]drastic,激烈的。
[225]protagonist,主角、领导者。
[226]Bretton Woods,布雷顿森林体系，是第二次世界大战后以美元为中心的国际货币体系协定。
[227]cede,放弃、割让、让与。
[228]bifurcated,分为两部分的。
[229]resilient,有弹性的、有复原力的。
[230]Lin Yifu,林毅夫，现任世界银行首席经济学家兼负责发展经济学的高级副行长。
[231]tutelage,保护、监护。
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