维持国际社会中的秩序

4.维持国际社会中的秩序　Maintenance of Order in World Politics^[146]

本节导读

赫德利·布尔（1932—1985年），“英国学派”最具代表性和学术影响的学者。国际关系理论界中的“英国学派”，又称“国际社会学派”，是二战后以英国为阵地逐渐衍生发展起来的一支独立于美国国际关系学界影响的国际关系理论流派，其影响在20世纪90年代以来日益彰显。该派主要代表人物大多在英国的国际关系院系接受教育或担任教学研究职位，但其中很多学者并非英国国籍，如布尔便是澳大利亚人。“英国学派”研究的核心概念是“国际社会”，认为无政府性质的国际体系存在着由国家组成的国际社会。该派学者广泛借鉴众家之长，如经典现实主义、新现实主义、社会建构主义等，甚至有将该学派称为“Liberal Realism”，但很难为其贴上明确的标签。该派学者虽在研究方法取向上存在多元主义者（pluralists）与社会连带主义（solidarists）之分，但总的来说思想倾向于格劳秀斯传统的“中间道路”（Via Media），公认的代表人物包括马丁·怀特（Martin Wight）、布尔和约翰·文森特（John Vincent）等人。

布尔涉猎甚广，在国际体系、军备控制、国际伦理等均有建树，作品包括《控制军备竞赛：导弹时代的裁军与军控》（The Control ofthe Arms Race:Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age,1965）、《无政府社会——世界政治秩序研究》（The Anarchical Society:A Study of Order in World Politics,1977）、《国际关系中的正义》（Justice in International Relations,1984）、《世界政治中的干涉》（Intervention in World Politics,1984）；1977年出版的《无政府社会：世界政治秩序研究》系统地提出了“国际社会”理论，是英国学派最重要的代表作之一，现已被奉为国际关系研究的经典之作。布尔认为，国际体系虽然处于无政府状态，但却存在着秩序，当代由国家组成的国际体系是一个国际社会。国际社会中秩序的维持有赖于：①各国之间存在着对共同利益（common interests）或共同价值观念（common values）的认知，②各国在交往中形成、认可并遵循一系列限定国家行为的规则（rules），③各国为确保共同规则行之有效而建立起一系列的运作机制（institutions）。

The maintenance of order in world politics depends,in the first instance^[147],on certain contingent^[148]facts which would make for order even if states were without any conception of common interests,common rules or common institutions—even if,in other words,they formed an international system only,and not also an international society.A balance of power,for example,may arise in an international system quite fortuitously^[149],in the absence of any belief that it serves common interests,or any attempt to regulate or institutionalise it.If it does arise,it may help to limit violence,to render undertakings credible or to safeguard governments from challenges to their local supremacy.Within international society,however,as in other societies,order is the consequence not merely of contingent facts such as this,but of a sense of common interests in the elementary goals of social life;rules prescribing^[150]behaviour that sustains these goals;and institutions that help to make these rules effective.

Common Interests

To say that x is in someone’s interest is merely to say that it serves as a means to some end that he is pursuing.Whether or not x does serve as a means to any particular end is a matter of objective fact.But whether or not x is in his interest will depend not only on this but also on what ends he is actually pursuing.It follows from this that the conception of interest is an empty or vacuous^[151]guide,both as to what a person does do and as to what he should do.To provide such a guide we need to know what ends he does or should pursue,and the conception of interest in itself tells us nothing about either.

Thus the criterion of‘national interest’,or‘interest of state’,in itself provides us with no specific guidance either in interpreting the behaviour of states or in prescribing how they should behave-unless we are told what concrete ends or objectives states do or should pursue:security,prosperity,ideological objectives or whatever.Still less does it provide us with a criterion that is objective,in the sense of being independent of the way state ends or purposes are perceived by particular decision-makers.It does not even provide a basis for distinguishing moral or ideological considerations in a country’s foreign policy from non-moral or non-ideological ones:for x can be in a country’s interest if it serves as a means to a moral or ideological objective that the country has.

However,the conception of national interest or interest of state does have some meaning in a situation in which national or state ends are defined and agreed,and the question at issue is by what means they can be promoted.To say that a state’s foreign policy should be based on pursuit of the national interest is to insist that whatever steps are taken should be part of some rational plan of action;an approach to foreign policy based on the national interest may thus be contrasted with one consisting simply of the uncritical pursuit of some established policy,or one consisting simply of unconsidered reactions to events.A policy based on the idea of the national interest,moreover,may be contrasted with one based on a sectional^[152]interest,or one based on the interests of some group wider than the state,such as an alliance or international organisation to which it belongs.To speak of the national interest as the criterion at least directs our attention to the ends or objectives of the nation or state,as against those of some other group,narrower or wider.

The maintenance of order in international society has as its starting-point the development among states of a sense of common interests in the elementary goals of social life.However different and conflicting their objectives may be,they are united in viewing these goals as instrumental^[153]to them.Their sense of common interests may derive from fear of unrestricted violence,of the instability of agreements or of the insecurity of their independence or sovereignty.It may have its origins in rational calculation that the willingness of states to accept restrictions on their freedom of action is reciprocal^[154].Or it may be based also on the treatment of these goals as valuable in themselves and not merely as a means to an end—it may express a sense of common values as well as of common interests.

Rules

In international society,as in other societies,the sense of common interests in elementary goals of social life does not in itself provide precise guidance as to what behaviour is consistent with these goals;to do this is the function of rules.These rules may have the status of international law,of moral rules,of custom or established practice,or they may be merely operational^[155]rules or‘rules of the game’, worked out without formal agreement or even without verbal communication.It is not uncommon for a rule to emerge first as an operational rule,then to become established practice^[156],then to attain the status of a moral principle and finally to be incorporated in a legal convention;this appears to have been the genesis,for example,of many of the rules now embodied in multilateral treaties or conventions concerning the laws of war,diplomatic and consular status,and the law of the sea.

The range of these rules is vast,and over much of this range they are in a state of flux^[157].Here we shall mention only three complexes^[158]of rules that play a part in the maintenance of international order.

First,there is the complex of rules that states^[159]what may be called the fundamental or constitutional normative principle of world politics in the present era. This is the principle that identifies the idea of a society of states,as opposed to such alternative ideas as that of a universal empire,a cosmopolitan community of individual human beings,or a Hobbesian^[160]state of nature or state of war,as the supreme normative principle of the political organisation of mankind.It is emphasised elsewhere in this study that there is nothing historically inevitable or morally sacrosanct^[161]about the idea of a society of states.Nor does this idea in fact monopolise human thought and action,even in the present phase;on the contrary,it has always had to do battle with competing principles,and does so now.Order on a world scale however,does require that one or another of these basic ideas should be clearly in the ascendancy;what is incompatible with order on a world scale is a discord of competing principles of universal political organisation.

On the one hand,the idea of international society identifies states as members of this society and the units competent to carry out political tasks within it,including the tasks necessary to make its basic rules effective;it thus excludes conceptions which assign this political competence to groups other than the state,such as universal authorities above it or sectional groups within it.On the other hand,the idea of international society identifies the relationship between the states as that of members of a society bound by common rules and committed to common institutions;it thus excludes the conception of world politics as a mere arena or state of war.

This fundamental or constitutional principle of international order is presupposed^[162]in ordinary state conduct.The daily actions of states—in arrogating to themselves the rights or competences of principal actors in world politics,and in combining with each other to this end,in resisting the claims of supra-state^[163]or sub-state^[164]groups to wrest^[165]these rights and competences from them—display this principle and provide evidence of its central role.The principle is contained in a number of basic rules of international law.Thus it has been the predominant doctrine that states are the only or the principal bearers of rights and duties in international law; that they alone have the right to use force to uphold it;and that its source lies in the consent of states,expressed in custom or treaty.The principle,however,is prior to international law,or to any particular formulation of international law;it is manifest in a whole complex of rules—legal,moral,customary and operational.It is not a static principle,but is subject to constant development.In the formative stages of international society,it had to meet the challenge of doctrines which proclaimed the right of individuals and of groups other than the state to a place in universal political organisation;and at the present time it faces a similar challenge.

Second,there are what may be called‘the rules of coexistence’^[166].Given the guidance supplied by the constitutional principle as to who are the members of international society,these rules set out the minimum conditions of their coexistence. They include,first of all,the complex of rules which restrict the place of violence in world politics.These rules seek to confine the legitimate use of violence to sovereign states and to deny it to other agents by confining legitimate violence to a particular kind of violence called‘war’,and by treating war as violence that is waged on the authority of a sovereign state.Furthermore,the rules seek to limit the causes or purposes for which a sovereign state can legitimately begin a war,for example by requiring that it be begun for a just cause,as maintained by the naturallaw doctrines of the formative era of the states system,or by requiring that it be begun only after certain other procedures had been tried first,as insisted by the Covenant of the League of Nations^[167].The rules also have sought to restrict the manner in which sovereign states conduct war,for example by insisting that war be conducted in a way proportionate to the end pursued,or in such a way as to spare non-combatants^[168],or so as to employ no more violence than necessary.In addition, the rules have sought to restrict the geographical spread of a war,by establishing the rights and duties of neutrals and belligerents in relation to one another.

There is a further complex of rules of coexistence which prescribes the behaviour appropriate to sustain the goal of the carrying out of undertakings.The basic rule pacta sunt servanda^[169],sometimes seen as a presupposition of the law of nations,and sometimes as a first principle of it,established the presumption on which alone there can be point in entering into agreements at all.Subordinate or qualifying rules^[170]concern whether or not good faith^[171]need be kept with heretics or infidels, whether or not agreements remain valid in changing circumstances and who is the judge as to whether or not they have changed,whether or not and in what sense agreements are valid that are imposed by force,what the circumstances are in which a party to an agreement can be released from it,what are the principles according to which agreements should be interpreted,whether or not and to what extent a new government succeeds to the obligations of its predecessors,and so on.

The rules of coexistence also include those which prescribe behaviour that sustains the goal of the stabilisation of each state’s control or jurisdiction over its own persons and territory.At the heart of this complex of rules is the principle that each state accepts the duty to respect the sovereignty or supreme jurisdiction of every other state over its own citizens and domain,in return for the right to expect similar respect for its own sovereignty from other states.A corollary^[172]or nearcorollary of this central rule is the rule that states will not intervene forcibly or dictatorially in one another’s internal affairs.Another is the rule establishing the‘equality’of all states in the sense of their like enjoyment of like rights of sovereignty.

Third,there is the complex of rules concerned to regulate co-operation among states—whether on universal or on a more limited scale—above and beyond what is necessary for mere coexistence.This includes the rules that facilitate co-operation, not merely of a political and strategic,but also of a social and economic nature. The growth in this century of legal rules concerned with co-operation between states in economic,social,communications and environmental matters exemplifies the place of rules of co-operation and will be considered later(see Chapter 6).

Rules of this kind prescribe behaviour that is appropriate not to the elementary or primary goals of international life,but rather to those more advanced or secondary goals that are a feature of an international society in which a consensus has been reached about a wider range of objectives than mere coexistence.Nevertheless,these rules may be said to play a role in relation to international order,inasmuch as the development of co-operation and consensus among states about these wider goals may be expected to strengthen the framework of coexistence.

This is not the place to expound these three complexes of rules in full,or to examine the problems of interpreting them or reconciling the conflicts between them. Nor is it appropriate here to consider which of them has the status of law,which the status of moral rules,which should be seen as customary or as operational rules,nor to trace the historical evolution through which these rules have passed from one of these embodiments to another,and sometimes back again.It is sufficient to note that the vast and changing corpus of rules and quasi-rules^[173],of which those cited are part of the central core,provide the means whereby international society moves from the vague perception of a common interest to a clear conception of the kind of conduct it requires.

Institutions

In international society it is the members of the society themselves—sovereign states—which are chiefly responsible for performing the functions of helping to make the rules effective;they do so in the absence of either a supreme government, which is able to undertake these functions in the modern state,or the degree of solidarity among themselves that characterises the performance of these functions by politically competent groups in primitive stateless societies.In this sense it is states themselves that are the principal institutions of the society of states.

Thus states undertake the function of making the rules,or legislating,by signifying their consent to them.Rules of general application,like the rules of coexistence,arise out of custom and established practice,and are in some cases confirmed by multilateral conventions.Rules that apply only to particular groups of states may also arise out of custom and established practice—as do the operational rules of crisis avoidance and management now being evolved by the great powers—but they may also be the subject of explicit^[174]agreements or treaties.

States communicate the rules through their official words,as when they state that they respect the legal principle of the sovereignty of states,or the moral principle of national self-determination^[175],or the operational rule that great powers should not interfere in each other’s spheres of influence.But they also communicate the rules through their actions,when they behave in such a way as to indicate that they accept or do not accept that a particular rule is valid.Because the communication of the rules is in the hands of states themselves,and not of an authority independent of them,the advertisement of the rules is commonly distorted in favour of the interests of particular states.

States administer the rules of international society inasmuch as executive acts ancillary^[176]to the rules themselves are performed either by themselves(as when particular states are designated as the depository states for a treaty^[177],or the guarantors^[178]of a neutralisation arrangement,or the arbiters of a dispute)or by international organisations which are responsible to them(as when organisations are set up to implement agreements concerning international post and telecommunications,or a host of other matters).

Each state provides its own interpretation of the rules—legal,moral or operational.Even in the case of legal rules,a state relies on its own legal advisers,and there is no conclusive way in which disagreements about interpretation can be settled by an independent authority.The interpretation of moral or of operational rules is even more uncertain.

The enforcement of the rules,in the absence of a central authority,is carried out by states,which may resort to acts of self-help^[179],including acts of force,in defence of their rights under operational,moral or legal rules.Because states are frequently not in a position to carry out effective action in defence of their rights,the enforcement of the rules is uncertain.Because of the low degree of consensus or solidarity among states,actions which the state committing them sees as self-help or ruleenforcement are frequently not viewed as such by international society at large.

States undertake the task of legitimising^[180]the rules,in the sense of promoting the acceptance of them as valuable in their own right,by employing their powers of persuasion and propaganda to mobilise support for them in world politics as a whole.At the present time an important means to the legitimisation of rules is to have them endorsed by international assemblies and international organisations.

States undertake the task of changing or adapting operational,moral and legal rules to changing circumstances,but have to do so in the absence of a universal legislative authority competent to rescind^[181]old rules and devise new ones,and with the handicap^[182]that there is often no consensus as to whether or not,or how,the rules should be changed.States change the rules by demonstrating through their words or their actions,that they are withdrawing their consent from old rules and bestowing it upon new ones,and thus altering the content of custom or established practice.The operational rules observed by great powers,whereby they respect one anothers’spheres of influence in particular parts of the world,are rescinded or changed when these powers show by what they do or say that they no longer accept them,or regard their boundaries or limiting conditions as having changed.The moral principle of national self-determination—the rule that states should be nation—states—came to displace^[183]that of dynastic legitimacy not by enactment of any legislative authority,but by war and revolution.In the changing of legal rules a part is sometimes played by multilateral conventions or treaties,but here also states change the old rules by violating or ignoring them systematically enough to demonstrate that they have withdrawn their consent to them.In other words,while the adaptation of the rules to changed circumstances is part of the process whereby order is maintained,it is itself often accompanied by disorder.

Finally,states undertake the task which,for want of^[184]a better term,has been called‘protection’of the rules.The rules which sustain order in international society can operate only if conditions obtain in the international political system that enable them to do so.In particular,they can operate only if that sense of common interests among states,which they seek to translate into a precise guide to conduct, continues to exist.The function of‘protection’of the rules comprises all those things which states may do to create or maintain that state or condition of the system in which respect for the rules can flourish.

The‘protection’of the rules encompasses,first and foremost,those classical acts of diplomacy and war whereby states seek to preserve a general balance of power in the international system(and today a relationship of mutual nuclear deterrence^[185]among contending nuclear powers);to accommodate or contain conflicts of ideology; to resolve or moderate conflicts of state interest;to limit or control armaments and armed forces in relation to interests perceived in international security;to appease the demands of dissatisfied^[186]states for what they regard as just change;and to secure and maintain the acquiescence of the smaller powers in the assumption by great powers of special rights and responsibilities.

These measures of‘protection’of the rules are not prescribed by the rules of coexistence,or by international law,in which some of the rules of coexistence are stated.Indeed,some of the measures which states take in the course of‘protecting’the rules may bring them into conflict with international law.The activities that go to make up‘protection’of the rules of coexistence are themselves the subject of further bodies of rules,such as those which regulate the balance of power, diplomacy and the special position of the great powers.

In carrying out these functions,states collaborate with one another,in varying degrees,in what may be called the institutions of international society:the balance of power,international law,the diplomatic mechanism,the managerial system of the great powers,and war.By an institution we do not necessarily imply an organisation or administrative machinery,but rather a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of common goals.These institutions do not deprive states of their central role in carrying out the political functions of international society,or serve as a surrogate^[187]central authority in the international system.They are rather an expression of the element of collaboration among states in discharging^[188]their political functions and at the same time a means of sustaining this collaboration.These institutions serve to symbolise the existence of an international society that is more than the sum of its members,to give substance and permanence to their collaboration in carrying out the political functions of international society,and to moderate their tendency to lose sight of common interests.The contributions of these institutions to international order,in the past and at present,are considered in Part 2.

思考题

1.What is the starting point for the maintenance of order in international society according to the author?

2.What are the 3 core complexes of rules that help maintain international order cited by the author?

3.How do states carry out their functions in term of rules-related tasks?

4.What does the author mean by“institutions”and what are their purposes?

5.Discuss the concept of“order”in world politics.