专业性国际经济组织

第三节　专业性国际经济组织

Section 3　Specialized International Economic Organizations

【The Fundamental】

There exist various specialized international economic organizations in the world,Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) of which is typical, so this section will center on it.

A. Organization and Objectives

The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is a permanent, intergovernmental Organization, created at the Baghdad Conference^[22]on September 10–14, 1960, by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. The five Founding Members were later joined by nine other Members: Qatar (1961); Indonesia (1962)-suspended its membership from January 2009; Libya (1962); United Arab Emirates (1967); Algeria (1969); Nigeria(1971); Ecuador (1973) –suspended its membership from December 1992-October 2007; Angola (2007) and Gabon (1975–1994). OPEC had its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, in the first five years of its existence. This was moved to Vienna, Austria, on September 1, 1965.

In accordance with its Statute^[23], the principal aim of the organization shall be the coordination and unification of the petroleum policies of Member Countries and the determination of the best means for safeguarding their interests, individually and collectively. The organization shall also devise ways and means of ensuring the stabilization of prices in international oil markets with a view to eliminating harmful and unnecessary fluctuations. Due regard shall be given at all times to the interests of the producing nations and to the necessity of securing a steady income to the producing countries; an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consuming nations; and a fair return on their capital to those investing in the petroleum industry.

B. OPEC Statute

When nations, groups or individuals come together for the achievement of a common objective, their aspirations and goals are often expressed in the form of a statement of principles or ‘statute’. Upon adoption, the Statute becomes a formal instrument that regulates the scope and authority of the group or organization. It may be amended as the Organization expands.

The Organization of OPEC has a Statute which was adopted by a unanimous decision of its Founder Members under Resolution II.6 at its second meeting held in January 1961 in Caracas, Venezuela.

The Statute stipulates that the principal aim of OPEC is to harmonise the petroleum policies of its Member Countries as part of its efforts to safeguard their interests. It further states that members of the Organization shall work together to ensure stable oil prices, secure fair returns to producing countries and investors in the oil industry, and provide a steady petroleum supply to consumers.

The Statute has been amended fourteen times over the course of the Organization’s 50-year history. All amendments and updates to the Organization’s statutes have been in line with the founding vision of the Organization and have been implemented in order to make the Organization function better, more efficiently and with a greater impact in the pursuit of its stated objectives.

C. Structure^[24]

1. The Conference.

The Conference is the supreme authority of the Organization, and consists of Heads of Delegation^[25]—normally the Ministers of Petroleum, Oil, Energy or equivalent portfolio of Member Countries. The Conference, which meets at least twice a year and operates on the principle of unanimity, is responsible for the formulation of the general policy of the Organization and the determination of the appropriate ways and means of its implementation. The Conference also decides on applications for membership of the Organization, and on reports and recommendations submitted by the Board of Governors on the affairs of the Organization. It approves the appointment of Governors from each Member Country and elects the Chairman of the Board. Moreover, the Conference directs the Board to submit reports or make recommendations on any matter of interest to the Organization, and considers and decides upon the Organization’s budget, as submitted to it by the Board.

2. The Board of Governors.

The Board of Governors is composed of one Governor nominated by each Member Country and confirmed by the Conference for two years. The Board directs the management of the Organization; implements resolutions of the Conference; draws up the Organization’s annual budget and submits it to the Conference for approval. It also decides upon any reports submitted by the Secretary General and submits reports and recommendations to the Conference on the affairs of the Organization.

3. The Secretariat.

The Secretariat carries out the executive functions of the Organization, in accordance with the provisions of the Statute and under the direction of the Board. It consists of the Secretary General and such staff as may be required. It is responsible for the implementation of all resolutions of the Conference, as well as decisions of the Board of Governors. It conducts research, the findings of which constitute key inputs in decision making. The Secretariat is made up of the Secretary General’s Office, the Research Division and the Support Services Division.

D. Brief History

1. The 1960s.

OPEC’s formation by five oil-producing developing countries in Baghdad in September 1960 occurred at a time of transition in the international economic and political landscape, with extensive decolonization and the birth of many new independent states in the developing world. The international oil market was dominated by the “Seven Sisters” multinational companies and was largely separate from that of the former Soviet Union (FSU) and other centrally planned economies (CPEs). OPEC developed its collective vision, set up its objectives and established its Secretariat, first in Geneva and then, in 1965, in Vienna. It adopted a ‘Declaratory Statement of Petroleum Policy in Member Countries’ in 1968, which emphasized the inalienable right of all countries to exercise permanent sovereignty over their natural resources in the interest of their national development. Membership grew to ten by 1969.

2. The 1970s.

OPEC rose to international prominence during this decade, as its Member Countries took control of their domestic petroleum industries and acquired a major say in the pricing of crude oil on world markets. On two occasions, oil prices rose steeply in a volatile market, triggered by the Arab oil embargo^[26]in 1973 and the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution^[27]in 1979.OPEC broadened its mandate with the first Summit of Heads of State and Government in Algiers in 1975^[28], which addressed the plight of the poorer nations and called for a new era of cooperation in international relations, in the interests of world economic development and stability. This led to the establishment of the OPEC Fund for International Development in 1976. Member Countries embarked on ambitious socio-economic development schemes. Membership grew to 13 by 1975.

3. The 1980s.

After reaching record levels early in the decade, prices began to weaken, before crashing in 1986, responding to a big oil glut and consumer shift away from this hydrocarbon. OPEC’s share of the smaller oil market fell heavily and its total petroleum revenue dropped below a third of earlier peaks, causing severe economic hardship for many Member Countries. Prices rallied in the final part of the decade, but to around half the levels of the early part, and OPEC’s share of newly growing world output began to recover. This was supported by OPEC introducing a group production ceiling divided among Member Countries and a Reference Basket for pricing, as well as significant progress with OPEC/non-OPEC dialogue and cooperation, seen as essential for market stability and reasonable prices. Environmental issues emerged on the international energy agenda.

4. The 1990s.

Prices moved less dramatically than in the 1970s and 1980s, and timely OPEC action reduced the market impact of Middle East hostilities in 1990–91. But excessive volatility and general price weakness dominated the decade, and the South-East Asian economic downturn and mild Northern Hemisphere winter of 1998–99 saw prices back at 1986 levels. However, a solid recovery followed in a more integrated oil market, which was adjusting to the post-Soviet world, greater regionalism, globalization, the communications revolution and other high-tech trends. Breakthroughs in producer-consumer dialogue matched continued advances in OPEC/non-OPEC relations. As the United Nations-sponsored climate change negotiations gathered momentum, after the Earth Summit of 1992, OPEC sought fairness, balance and realism in the treatment of oil supply. One country left OPEC, while another suspended its Membership.

5. The 2000s.

An innovative OPEC oil price band mechanism helped strengthen and stabilize crude prices in the early years of the decade. But a combination of market forces, speculation andother factors transformed the situation in 2004, pushing up prices and increasing volatility in a well-supplied crude market. Oil was used increasingly as an asset class. Prices soared to record levels in mid-2008, before collapsing in the emerging global financial turmoil and economic recession. OPEC became prominent in supporting the oil sector, as part of global efforts to address the economic crisis. OPEC’s second and third summits in Caracas and Riyadh in 2000 and 2007 established stable energy markets, sustainable development and the environment as three guiding themes, and it adopted a comprehensive long-term strategy in 2005. One country joined OPEC, another reactivated its Membership and a third suspended it.

E. The OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID)

Sovereigns and Heads of State of OPEC Member Countries (MCs) do not meet regularly. However, when they do meet, the impact is felt beyond the confines of the Organization’s MCs and for decades too. Such meetings also, have the tendency to affect lives in a positive way.

This could be said to be the effect their first meeting in 1975 has had on the world’s poor countries through the OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID). Established as a multilateral development finance institution to promote cooperation between Member States of OPEC and other developing countries, OFID was conceived at the Summit of the Sovereigns and Heads of State of the OPEC Member Countries (MCs) held in the Algerian capital, Algiers, in March 1975.

The Solemn Declaration, issued by the Summit, ‘reaffirmed the natural solidarity which unites OPEC MCs with other developing countries in their struggle to overcome under-development, and called for measures to strengthen cooperation with these countries.’

In this spirit, OFID was established in January 1976, as a collective financial facility to consolidate the assistance extended by its Member Countries namely Algeria, Gabon, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela. OFID’s resources are additional to those already made available by OPEC MCs through a number of bilateral and multilateral channels. The resources of OFID consist mainly of voluntary contributions by OPEC MCs and income derived from OFID’s investments and loans (interest and service charges).

OFID’s operations were launched in August 1976 with initial resources of about $800 million. This amount has since then been replenished three times. It has also been further increased by the profits accruing to seven OPEC Member Countries through the sale of gold held by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

All non-OPEC developing countries are, in principle, eligible for OFID assistance. However, the least developed and other low-income countries are accorded priority and, therefore, receive a larger share. Over the years, OFID has spread its financing to 125 countries, of which 51 are in Africa, 42 in Asia, 28 in Latin America and the Caribbean, and four in Europe.

In the public sector, OFID has implemented 16 lending programs since its inception. The 17th Lending Programme, approved for a three-year duration, became effective 1 January 2008. By the end of March 2010, a cumulative amount of $8 703m had been committed for 1 264 public sector loans, of which $5 221m had been disbursed. As of 1 January 2009, 74 per cent of outstanding loans were with Low Income countries and 50 per cent of all commitments were to Africa.

Under the Private Sector Facility established in 1998, 144 operations have been approved in support of private entities in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe. By the end of March 2010, $1 190m had been committed and $525m disbursed.

In 2006, a Trade Financing program was launched. By the end of March 2010, $578m in lines of credit and $619m in risk-sharing guarantees had been approved and $285m had been disbursed.

In the framework of grants, assistance is extended to social and humanitarian development operations through three regular grant programs; Technical Assistance, Research and Similar Activities and Emergency Relief Aid. OFID has also established special grant accounts to respond to specific global needs. These include grants for the establishment of the Common Fund for Commodities, in addition to a Special Account for HIV/AIDS Operations and a Special Account for Palestine. Intermittently, OFID extended special grants in support of contemporary issues, such as the grant for the establishment of IFAD and the food crisis in Africa. By the end of March 2010, 1 205 grants, amounting to $483m, had been extended.

In addition, OFID channeled $972m to two international institutions: it has channeled OPEC Members’ contributions to the initial capital and first replenishment of IFAD’s resources and made irrevocable transfers in the name of seven OPEC Members to the Trust Fund of the IMF. OFID’s total approved commitments (including grants and contributions to other institutions) as at the end of March 2010 stood at $11 926m.

(Adapted from http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/)

[The Reflections]

1. What is OPEC and what does OPEC do?

2. What are the principal aims of OPEC?

3. Why is OPEC of such great importance to the whole world?

4. How do you understand the brief history of OPEC?

5. How do you understand the OFID?

【The In-depth】

The Real Oil Problem

A. Is Oil Running Out?

Oil is not the first fossil fuel that conventional wisdom has identified as nearing exhaustion. Even before 1800, the worry in Europe was that coal—the supposed foundation of their greatness—would run out. European production actually did peak in 1913, and is nearly negligible today. Is that the result of exhaustion? Hardly—there are billions of tons in the ground in Europe. But it would cost too much for the Europeans to dig it out. At a price that would cover cost, there is no demand. Hence, the billions of tons of European coal are worthless and untouched. The amount of a mineral that is in the ground has no meaning apart from its cost of extraction and the demand for it.

In 1875, John Strong Newberry, the chief geologist of the state of Ohio, predicted that the supply of oil would soon run out. The alarm has been sounded repeatedly in the many decades since. In 1973, State Department analyst James Akins, then the chief U.S. policymaker on oil, published “The Oil Crisis: This time the wolf is here,” in which he called for more domestic production and for improved relations with oil-producing nations in the Middle East. In 1979, President Jimmy Carter, echoing a CIA assessment, said that oil wells “were drying up all over the world.” Just last year, the New York Times reported that “oil reserves are expected to dwindle in the decades ahead,” while the International Energy Agency forecasted that oil output will grow in the Persian Gulf between now and 2030, but it will decline elsewhere.

The doomsday predictions have all proved false. In 2003, world oil production was 4 400 times greater than it was in Newberry’s day, but the price per unit was probably lower. Oil reserves and production even outside the Middle East are greater today than they were when Akins claimed the wolf was here. World output of oil is up a quarter since Carter’s “drying up”pronouncement, but Middle East exports peaked in 1976–77.

Despite all those facts, the predictions of doom keep on coming.

B. The Real Oil Crisis

The true crisis (or whatever it is) started in 1973–74 when a dozen mostly Middle Eastern nations mutually agreed to cut their output. They have been constraining production ever since. They lock away and sterilize the cheapest oil in the world to raise the price and their revenues.

The resulting effects have prompted a series of government efforts to avert an oil crisis. As a New York Times editorial observed last September, “Every president starting with Richard Nixon and the 1973 oil embargo has promised to reduce America’s ravenous appetite for oil while investing heavily in new energy sources.” Few members of those administrations disagreed with the Carter belief in an oil gap and an energy gap—and each administration has advocated a broad range of energy policies and government spending.

The Carter White House advanced legislation discouraging the use of natural gas for“low-end” uses like power generation, even though natural gas is plentiful and burns cleaner than oil or coal. Instead, the administration advocated tax credits and subsidies for the use of synthetic fuels and for expansion of the use of coal. The Internal Revenue Service recently confirmed that the $20 billion-a-year “spray and pray” credit, which encourages the production of a supposed synthetic fuel by spraying fuel oil on purportedly unusable coal dust to make usable lumps, is still in place. The current Energy Bill—or “Energy Barbecue”—will create all sorts of new handouts, vested interests, and jobs that will be hotly defended in later years. The more wasteful a law, the more defenders it creates.

From the Nixon White House to the present, all administrations have approached oil and energy with command-and-control policies. None of them attempted to analyze the problems using the price mechanism. “Not enough” oil was being produced, and that problem was too important to leave to a sloppy price system.

C. Future Prices and Production

OPEC’s constant concern has been to restrict supply and resist downward price pressure. Whenever they forgot this, they were brutally reminded—as in 1980–85 and in 1997. But always, they were exhorted from inside and outside the organization to look to the bright horizon of the near future. Very soon, they were told, non-OPEC output would fail for lack of reserves and OPEC market share would rise. But non-OPEC production crept up and the share of OPEC exports fell. Once around 65 percent, OPEC exports are now 30–35 percent of the world oil market. Only as the production restriction became tighter did the cartel receive some cooperation from non-OPEC nations.

Saudi Arabia’s oil minister has said that the kingdom will not cut production again without cooperation from inside and outside OPEC. Common sense supports that. Had the Saudis been the only ones to cut in 1999, they would have lost money just as in 1980, and they would have failed to make the price increase stick.

1. Dependence on oil.

Price fixing by private companies on the OPEC scale would not be tolerated in any industrial country. In the United States, the officers of firms that engage in such activities go to jail. But the OPEC members are sovereign states, subject to no country’s laws. Moreover, the United States and other nations want to think they have the OPEC nations’ support—particularly the Saudis.

This alleged support consists in “access” to oil. But in a global market filled with buyers and sellers, everyone has access. Another myth is mutual obligation: The OPEC nations’supply oil, the United States protects them. In truth there is no choice; we must protect the OPEC nations from outsiders or neighbors. They owe us nothing for protection and will give us nothing. Of course, OPEC will supply oil. The only question is how much oil—and that determines the price. The supposed OPEC (or Saudi) obligation to supply is what lawyers call“void for vagueness.” But those in government crave assurance that they are accomplishing something, and they will pay for that assurance.

After 30 years of high export earnings, the OPEC nations remain as dependent on selling oil as ever. In OPEC nations, oil exports still pay for nearly everything. Fifty years ago, Venezuela encapsulated the idea of using oil money to develop non-oil industries into a fine slogan: Sembrar el petroleo—“Plant the oil.” In the Middle East, although some small OPEC states accumulated financial assets abroad, cartel members failed completely to develop other export industries. Those member nations now are usually broke, cannot save, and cannot plan ahead.

Where did the $3 trillion in oil revenues go? Mostly to armaments, subsidies, payoffs, population growth, and grandiose prestige projects—far la bella figura, as the Italians say. Showy projects look bad when neglected. The Saudis in 1980 had $180 billion in foreign assets. They are now in debt, running deficits even in the last few years.

In Iraq, history did an experiment. In 1991 when oil exports vanished because of UN action, national GDP shrank by 86 percent. Iraqi non-oil industries existed to sell to the oil industry or to locals with oil income, but suddenly there was no oil industry or income. Some Iraqi non-oil industries were stateowned Soviet-style clunkers, others were subsidized orshielded by tariffs and import quotas along with corruption. As a result, Iraq’s non-oil economy—even today—is small and jobs are scarce. For thousands of years, Mesopotamia,“the land between the rivers,” was a big wheat exporter, but no more. Saudi Arabia now grows and exports wheat at a cost many times the market price. To grow it, they use up underground water deposits at ever-rising cost. Of course, this builds a huge vested interest in continued spending.

OPEC nations have little but oil income and most of them live in a rough neighborhood. Government decision-makers in those nations have a shorter time horizon than private companies. They pursue short-run gain, disregarding the long-run pain. Hence, OPEC cartels are hasty and extreme, and they push to raise prices faster and further than would private firms. OPEC members get good advice to cut their price in order to slow or stop consumers’investment in energy savings and non-OPEC oil producers’ investment in new capacity. But investment takes time, and the members cannot take time. OPEC nations will continue to “take the cash and let the credit go/ nor heed the rumble of a distant Drum.” They choose higher prices now, despite lower sales later. Some 70 years ago, an oilman reported back to his company about Persian Gulf rulers: “The future leaves them cold. They want money now.”They still do. The OPEC nations’ model is King Philip II of Spain, the richest king in Europe, who went broke the most often. He spent his vast mineral revenues to support bad habits, and buy glory. When a year’s revenues were low, he borrowed against the following year’s income. That behavior ruined Spain then, and it is ruining the OPEC nations now.

2. Cooperation with OPEC.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) and the U.S. government recently reaffirmed their cooperation with OPEC. IEA discourages importing nations from using strategic stocks, including the United States’ Strategic Petroleum Reserve. The importer nations have agreed not to use those stocks unless there is a serious “real shortage.” If so, they will never be used. In a market economy, the price changes to equate the amount supplied to the amount demanded, precluding a “real shortage,” then or now. As ever, the IEA and the United States ignore price.

In 1974, the IEA established the rule that no strategic stocks could be used without a“gap” between demand and supply of at least 7 percent. But in 1978–80, the oil price tripled for the usual reason: not that wells were giving out but because OPEC nations, particularly Saudi Arabia, shut in production rather than let it expand to make up for Iranian fluctuations. There was no use of strategic stocks. The Carter administration had previously agreed not touse the Strategic Petroleum Reserve without Saudi permission.

OPEC has just cut production quotas for precisely the same reason: to head off lower demand later. Thus we are in the same position today as in 1979. The cartel members supposedly cooperating with us were and are committed to nothing. They will raise or lower output to increase their profits. There is and will be no shortage; they are glad to produce the amount they have themselves decided. They will never cut off output in the future, any more than in the past—it would cost them money.

D. Conclusion.

Use of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve would signal that there are some limits to our patience. It would lower prices and discourage speculation. U.S. oil policies are based on fantasies not facts: gaps, shortages, and surpluses. Those ideas are at the core of the Carter legislation, and of the current Energy Bill. The Carter White House also believed what the current Bush White House believes—that, in the face of all evidence, they are getting binding assurance of supply by OPEC, or by Saudi Arabia. That myth is part of the larger myth that the world is running out of oil.

(Written by Adelman, Morris A., Regulation, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2004.)

[The Terms]

1. State Department:（美国）国务院

2. CIA (Central Intelligence Agency): （美国）中央情报局

3. International Energy Agency: 国际能源署

4. Internal Revenue Service: 美国国内税务署

[The Discussions]

1. The author’s opinion on “oil crisis”.

2. The author’s opinion on the organization of OPEC.

3. The way OPEC speculates in the world’s oil market.

【The Further Sources】

Stoft, Steven E., Carbonomics: How to Fix the Climate and Charge it to OPEC (November 17, 2008).

Waller, Spencer Weber, Suing OPEC . University Pittsburgh Law Review, Vol. 64, No. 105, 2002.

Vatter, Marc H., OPEC’s Demand Curve (May 30, 2008).

【注释】

[1]WTO的前身是关税与贸易总协定（GATT）。1947年4月，美、英、法、中等23个国家在日内瓦举行关税减让谈判，签订了100多项双边关税减让协议。这些谈判成果与“哈瓦那宪章”中有关贸易的条款后来被汇编成“关税与贸易总协定”。该协定从1948年1月1日正式生效，在之后的48年中，关贸总协定作为一个多边国际协定发挥了重要的作用，通过八轮多边贸易谈判大大削减了国际贸易中不合理的障碍。

[2]多哈回合即多哈回合贸易谈判，又称多哈发展议程，是世界贸易组织于2001年11月在卡塔尔首都多哈举行的世界贸易组织第四次部长级会议中开始的新一轮多边贸易谈判，旨在推动全球农业、制造业和服务贸易的自由化，建立更合理的多边贸易体系。但时间已走过十余年，谈判还是磕磕盼盼，因为谈判各方对削减关税以及商品补贴的提案争执不下。在这期间，全球经济力量逐渐向有利于中国、印度和巴西等新兴经济体的方向变迁，使这一问题更趋复杂。

[3]de facto:（拉）实际的，事实上的

[4]GATT从1948年1月1日至1994年12月31日，共计47年，其间共举行8轮贸易谈判。前7轮谈判的主要内容是关税减让，第8轮谈判的主要内容是非关税措施的消除和服务贸易。

[5]《贸易政策审议机制》（Trade Policy Review Mechanism，TPRM）是世界贸易组织管辖的一项多边贸易协议，其目的是通过对各成员的全部贸易政策和做法及其对多边贸易体制运行的影响进行定期的集体审议和评估，促进所有成员更好地遵守多边贸易协议和适用的诸边贸易协议项下的规则、纪律和承诺，并通过深入了解各成员的贸易政策和实践，实现其更大的透明度而使多边贸易体制更加平稳地运作。

[6]份额（quota），是指成员国参加IMF时所要认缴的一定数额的款项，一旦认缴就成为IMF的财产。份额的作用是多方面的，它既是IMF的最大资金来源，也是决定成员国投票权、借款权的最主要因素。

[7]1944年，联合国赞助的财金会议于美国新罕布什尔州的布雷顿森林举行，同年7月22日，各国在会议上签订了成立国际货币基金的协议。协议的条款于1945年12月27日付诸实行，1946年5月国际货币基金组织正式成立，是为二战完结后之重建计划的一部份，1947年3月1日正式运作。1980年4月17日，IMF正式决定恢复中国的合法席位。

[8]二十世纪三十年代美国经济大萧条（1929-1939）。

[9]20国集团属非正式论坛，旨在促进工业化国家和新兴市场国家就国际货币和金融体系的重要问题开展富有建设性和开放性的对话，以此加强国际金融体系架构。20国集团成员由19国的财政部部长和中央银行行长组成，即中国、阿根廷、澳大利亚、巴西、加拿大、法国、德国、印度、印度尼西亚、意大利、日本、韩国、墨西哥、俄罗斯、沙特阿拉伯、南非、土耳其、英国和美国。另一成员是欧盟，由欧盟轮值主席国和欧洲中央银行行长代表欧盟参会。

[10]至2012年5月止，共有27个成员国，他们是：英国、法国、德国、意大利、荷兰、比利时、卢森堡、丹麦、爱尔兰、希腊、葡萄牙、西班牙、奥地利、瑞典、芬兰、马耳他、塞浦路斯、波兰、匈牙利、捷克、斯洛伐克、斯洛文尼亚、爱沙尼亚、拉脱维亚、立陶宛、罗马尼亚、保加利亚。

[11]2007年10月19日，欧盟非正式首脑会议在葡萄牙首都里斯本通过了《里斯本条约》。同年12月13日，欧盟成员国领导人在里斯本签署《里斯本条约》，随后交由各成员国批准，各国批准后，条约于2009年1月生效。但各国批准进程比预想困难许多，直到2009年11月3日，捷克总统克劳斯才宣布签署《里斯本条约》，至此欧盟27个成员国才全部批准该条约。新条约的诞生将进一步改革欧盟机构，简化欧盟的决策进程。

[12]1957年3月25日，在欧洲煤钢共同体的基础上，法国、联邦德国、意大利、荷兰、比利时和卢森堡6国政府首脑和外长在罗马签署了《欧洲经济合作条约》和《欧洲原子能共同体条约》，后来人们将这两项条约称为《罗马条约》。同年7月19日到12月4日，六国议会先后批准《罗马条约》，条约于1958年1月1日生效。该条约的生效标志着欧洲联盟的前身—欧洲经济共同体的正式成立，即正式确定了建立一个共同市场的总目标，是欧洲一体化的重要步骤。

[13]1980年，波兰格但斯克的列林造船厂工人举行罢工，争取更好的生活条件，最终引发了巨大的政治变革。

[14]《单一欧洲法令》是欧洲一体化进程中的重大突破，对创建三个共同体的条约进行了重大修订，提出建立共同市场，并要求成员国在对外政策方面“用一个声音说话”，该法令于1987年7月1日生效。

[15]《马斯特里赫特条约》又称《欧洲联盟条约》。1991年12月9-10日，第46届欧洲共同体首脑会议在荷兰的马斯特里赫特（Maastricht）举行。经过两天辩论，通过并草签了《欧洲经济与货币联盟条约》和《政治联盟条约》，即《马斯特里赫特条约》。这一条约是对《罗马条约》的修订，它为欧共体建立政治联盟和经济与货币联盟确立了目标与步骤，是欧洲联盟成立的基础。

[16]1997年10月2日，欧盟15个成员国的外交部长在荷兰首都阿姆斯特丹正式签署了《阿姆斯特丹条约》。《阿姆斯特丹条约》是对欧盟已有条约（主要是《马斯特里赫特条约》与《罗马条约》）的一项修正案，主要是通过改写、添加或删节现有条约条款及附件如议定书、声明、宣言等，对之进行修订和增补，它在一定范围内首次赋予了欧共体采取协调或统一各成员国国际私法的措施的权力，这是欧洲国际私法统一化进程中从未实现的一个重大突破。

[17]欧元是欧盟27个成员国中17个国家的货币，他们是爱尔兰、奥地利、比利时、德国、法国、芬兰、荷兰、卢森堡、葡萄牙、西班牙、希腊、意大利、斯洛文尼亚、塞浦路斯、马耳他、斯洛伐克、爱沙尼亚。

[18]为实现贸易与环境的协调，美国、加拿大、墨西哥三国于1993年签订了附属协定—《北美环境合作协定》，同时还设立了北美环境合作委员会。该协定于1994年1月1日正式生效。

[19]1967年8月8日，印度尼西亚、泰国、菲律宾、新加坡、马来西亚五国外长在曼谷举行会议，会后发表《东南亚国家联盟成立宣言》（即曼谷宣言），正式宣告东南亚国家联盟成立。宣布该联盟的宗旨是：“通过共同的努力，促进本地区的经济增长、社会进步和文化发展”，“促进东南亚的和平与安定”。

[20]1976年2月24日，印尼、菲律宾、马来西亚、泰国、新加坡在印尼巴厘岛举行的东南亚国家联盟第一次首脑会议上签订了《东南亚友好合作条约》。迄今东南亚10国已全部加入该条约。条约宗旨是“促进地区各国人民之间永久和平、友好和合作，以加强他们的实力、团结和密切关系”。除东盟成员国外，目前加入条约的还有中国、印度、日本、韩国、俄罗斯、新西兰和美国等国。我国于2003年10月举行的第7次东盟与中国领导人会议上正式加入该条约。

[21]东盟共同体。随着经济合作不断深化，特别是经历了97到98年的亚洲金融危机，东盟国家普遍认识到，只有在政治、经济、安全与社会等领域加强合作，建立区域自觉应对外部冲击的多种机制，才能保证区域的安全、稳定与发展，建立一个类似于欧盟的“东盟共同体”的设想便应运而生。2003年10月，第九届东盟首脑会议发表了《东盟第二协约宣言》，正式宣布将于2020年建成东盟共同体，其三大支柱分别是“安全共同体”、“经济共同体”和“社会文化共同体”。

[22]1960年9月伊拉克政府邀请沙特阿拉伯、伊朗、科威特和委内瑞拉四国的代表为对付西方石油公司企业再次降低石油标价在伊拉克首都巴格达举行会议，决定成立石油输出国组织。

[23]欧佩克组织条例，后经14次修改，其最初版本于1961年1月在委内瑞拉首都加拉加斯召开的会议上获得通过。

[24]欧佩克组织由欧佩克大会、欧佩克理事会和欧佩克秘书处组成。

[25]欧佩克各成员国向大会派出以石油、矿产和能源部长（大臣）为首的代表团。

[26]阿拉伯国家石油禁运。上世纪70年代以后，西方世界对石油的需求急剧增长，但是，西方石油公司却不肯对主要生产石油的发展中国家的提价要求作出让步，双方的矛盾日益尖锐，大有剑拔弩张之势。正在此时，1973年10月6日，第四次阿以战争爆发，在这场战争中，中东地区一些国家的部长要求美国撤回对以色列的支持。然而，美国却加大对以色列的支持力度，这迫使阿拉伯国家宣布将停止任何驶往美国的油轮。10月17日，输往美国的石油被被完全切断。

[27]伊朗革命是19世纪末至20世纪初，由开明士绅、资产阶级知识分子和上层僧侣发动的君主立宪活动加强。在俄国1905年革命影响下，同年12月德黑兰、大不里士、设拉子等城市爆发了由僧侣领导的大规模示威游行和罢工。群众要求召开议会，制定宪法，斗争持续了8个月。

[28]欧佩克组织的首届峰会于1975年在阿尔及利亚首都阿尔及尔举行，它呼吁定下稳定而合理的物价、国际食物和农业计划、由南至北的技术转移，及经济系统的民主。